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It is a remarkable feature of our contemporary understanding of the world that if 
forced to describe it, we would normally do so in one of two ways.  One would be in 
terms of its physical and biological geography (a description of continents, oceans, 
climate and plant or animal life-forms); the other in terms of its political geography, 
as being a world divided systematically and uniformly by reference to the territorial 
parameters of states (as one would find marked by colours within an Atlas).  That the 
second form of representation appears significant is to mark the extraordinary power 
that that idea of the state has come to play in the formation of our social, political, 
economic and cultural world view.  Not only is it now an apparently universal 
institution, but its very centrality in the structures of consciousness by which we 
construct the social world is to render it, as Bourdieu puts it, almost ‘unthinkable’ 
(Bourdieu, 2014, p. 4).  The languages through which we might want to describe it – 
like international law – are often the languages that the state itself has produced. 
 
However much we may take its presence for granted in an era in which virtually the 
entire surface of the earth is now covered in nation-states, this incredibly powerful 
and monolithic way of organising collective life has not been a permanent feature in 
history.  If, for sake of argument, we identify states simply with the existence of 
‘political communities’, then states have been around for centuries, even millennia-  
from the ancient city-state of Athens (c. 508-322 BCE) to the Kingdom of Aksum (c. 
100-940 CE) to the Chinese Empire (c. 221 BCE - 1912 CE).  They have, however, also 
changed much over this time (Tilly, 1992; Spruyt, 1994).  Broadly speaking, until 
about 200 years ago, the distribution of political authority around the globe could 
largely be described in terms of its relative intensity. High levels of loyalty and 
allegiance to the ‘sovereign’ were concentrated in ‘centres of power’ within denser 
urban sites, which then shaded off in the more remote frontier zones at the outer 
edges of the realm.  Today, by contrast, we inhabit a global order framed in terms of 
an undeniably Western European model of the nation-state, characterised by the 
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possession of determinate boundaries, centralised bureaucratic structures and a 
single, uniform system of law (Weber, 1978; Giddens 1985).  The purchase of this 
institution upon the political imagination has been such that not only does the daily 
routine of ‘politics’ remains firmly embedded within its frame (institutionalised, for 
example, in parliamentary debates, elections and campaigns for office), but that even  
movements of resistance tend to adopt it as their principal mode of emancipation.   
 
This is to prompt a series of questions: what is it about the idea of the state that 
makes its ‘status’ so ubiquitously desirable? From the eccentric ‘micro-nation’ 
projects of Liberland, North Sudan, Enclava and Sealand, to the international jihadist 
group which styles itself ISIS or ‘Islamic State’, to oppressed peoples within states 
like the Kurds and the Oromo, to former colonies denied like Palestine and Western 
Sahara which have been denied the right to self-determination through military 
occupation, the desire to become a ‘state’ appears to be the uniform objective.  So why 
is collective liberation so consistently narrated in the language of statehood? And why 
does opposition to the state appear to resolve itself so regularly in the emergence of 
yet another state?1  
 
Yet even as independence movements - in places as diverse as Bougainville, 
Chechnya, Catalonia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Somaliland, Scotland or West Irian - 
continue to re-affirm the singularity of the state as the primary mode of political 
organization, they also threaten it in doing so.  Not only do such secessionist 
movements challenge the integrity of the state against which they assert their 
independence; they also pose a challenge to the broader international order within 
which each state necessarily locates itself and upon which it relies for its legitimacy.  
Not all such movements turn out in the same way of course.  In some cases, claims to 
independence are given the definitive seal of statehood by membership in the United 
Nations (e.g. Eritrea 1993). In others, effective self-government continues, yet the 
claim to independent statehood goes decisively unrecognized (e.g. Somaliland 1996-).  
Still other attempts at forming new sovereign states survive in an apparent twilight 
zone of partial recognition (e.g. Kosovo 2009-, Palestine 1988-).  At such moments, 
international lawyers are often asked for advice. Is it right or proper for other states 
to recognize such claims?  What are the implications for doing so, or indeed for 
                                                 
1 Some recent examples: the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, officially parts of 
Georgia, was declared, by decree, by Russia on 26 August 2008; the ‘Independent state of 
Azawad’ was declared in northern Mali on 6 April 2012; the ‘Republic of Crimea’ declared its 
independence from Ukraine on 11 March 2014. .   
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refusing such recognition?  How far does institutional membership go to determine 
the outcome in such cases?  What consideration should be given to the democratic 
credentials of the new state or the role played by human rights?  This, at first, seems 
appropriate. After all, international lawyers are supposed to possess some special 
kind of expertise in this area, one that is sought not only by those concerned with the 
distributional consequences of any political change, but by the public at large. 
International law is, indeed, usually defined as the law that applies as between 
sovereign states, and international lawyers have spent an inordinate amount of time 
on the attempt to determine what they are, how they come into being, and how they 
change.  Yet on closer inspection, this faith in international law as a source of 
definitive answers to questions about the who, what, why and how of statehood – 
questions with huge implications for the territories and populations involved – is 
undercut by the very proximity of the problem to the language and practice of 
international law itself.   The ‘state’ is almost too self-evident. 
 
An initial difficulty here is that the central position assigned to states in the formation 
of rules of international law has created something of a logical impasse for 
international lawyers when they attempt to conceptualise how that same law might 
regulate states’ existence or demise. An early attempt to do so, is to be found in Lassa 
Oppenheim’s dizzyingly circular explanation in his classic Treatise of 1905:  
 
The conception of International Persons is derived from the conception of the 
Law of Nations. As this law is the body of rules which the civilised states 
consider legally binding in their intercourse, every state which belongs to the 
civilised states, and is, therefore, a member of the Family of Nations, is an 
International Person (Oppenheim, 1905, p. 99).  
 
In this formulation, states are entities that possess international personality under 
international law, and they do so because international law lays down that this should 
be so. But international law is, in turn, merely the ‘body of rules’ which the states 
consider to be ‘binding in their intercourse’ with one another.  The legal personality 
of the state then, is seen to be a product of the law of which it (the state) is deemed to 
be the author.  As form of ‘bootstraps’ argument, this was clearly an unsatisfactory 
formulation, but it is important to recall that its origin was found in a determination, 
on the part of those such as Oppenheim to try to demonstrate that international law 
could be regarded as a ‘positive’ branch of law, notwithstanding the absence of a 
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super-sovereign from which normatively binding ‘commands’ could derive (the 
critique launched by John Austin in 1832; see Austin, 1995, p. 123), without resort to 
the kinds of normative presuppositions associated with the ‘natural law’ thinking of 
the previous three centuries.  And the centrality of the state in the organisation and 
ordering of international society was, for international lawyers working in that vein, 
largely a pre-supposition rather than a conclusion. 
 
A little more than a hundred years later, however, talk of both the exclusivity of states 
as subjects of international law and of states as primary actors in international 
relations is regarded as an increasingly antiquated proposition.  Within international 
law itself, international organizations, individuals, minorities, corporations and even 
animals and rivers have all made the transition from being the object of international 
law to agents in possession of some kind of international ‘subjectivity’ or ‘personality’ 
(see Johns (ed), 2010). Non-state actors (whether NGOs or International 
Organizations) are playing an increasingly important role in treaty-making, and the 
figure of the ‘international community’ is repeatedly invoked (in the context, for 
example, of the elaboration of erga omnes obligations) as an entity having some, 
albeit still rather vague, legal status.2 ‘Statism’, indeed, is increasingly used as a 
derogatory label, attached to any approach that is seen to prioritise the interests of 
states over those of the individuals, communities and environments over which they 
exert authority (see Marks, 2006).  
 
At the same time, however, the story of the gradual ‘decline of the Nation state’ is 
often told with a hint of nostalgia. Writing in 1998, for example, Oscar Schachter 
observed that the growth, and increased mobility, of capital and technology, the 
formation of ‘new social identities’ (forged as much by transnational drugs traffickers 
and arms traders as by international NGOs), and the emergence of ‘failed states’ (see 
below) posed enormous challenges to the idea of a global order of states regulated by 
rules of international law (Schachter, 1998, pp. 10-16). Nonetheless, despite the 
trends, Schachter concluded that ‘it [was] most unlikely that the state will disappear 
in the foreseeable future’.  Not only has the state provided the structures of authority 
needed to cope with the ‘incessant claims of competing societal groups’, he argued, 
but it still promises dignity and protection for the individual with access to common 
institutions and the equal protection of the law (Schachter, 1998, p 22). For 
                                                 
2 See eg ILC Articles on the Responsibility of states for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001) 
Articles, 33, 42, 48. 
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Schachter, then, the key question was not so much whether the state as such would 
survive, but whether international law would be able to adjust to such phenomena 
and respond to the changing demands of the environment in which it operated. 
 
Whether or not one accepts Schachter’s diagnosis, or indeed his confidence for the 
future, there are two broad themes interwoven in his analysis that are widely shared.  
One is a factual or sociological reflection on the changing character of international 
society and the declining power or authority of the nation-state, witnessed by the 
emergence of alternative schemes of legal responsibility and a broadening of the 
range of international actors.3  The other is a normative or ethical variant which 
regards the tradition of state ‘sovereignty’ as an archaic impediment to the pursuit of 
humanitarian or other cosmopolitan agendas (human rights, environmental 
protection, criminal justice etc) and which has often been called upon to legitimate 
interventionist policies aimed specifically at undermining the exclusive authority of 
the state.4  To pose this opposition in the form of a question: is the authority of the 
state objectively-speaking ‘in decline’, or does that authority need to be challenged in 
order, for example, to ‘protect’ vulnerable populations? In some ways, of course, 
these two forms of reflection work against each other: the first seeing states as 
increasingly marginalised by social forces that escape their regulative or coercive 
capabilities; the second believing that states retain an authority that needs to be 
dismantled before emancipatory agendas may be put in place.  Where they meet, 
furthermore, is in an alarming vision of global order in which the state as political 
agent, instructed with the task of ‘mediating’ between the individual and the general 
interest, has neither the ability nor the competence to resist the incursions of a global 
‘community’ that claims both power and justice on its own side.5   
 
Before we settle upon such a conclusion, however, we might also want to consider an 
alternative narrative here – that concerns the way in which state, as the principal 
mode, or technology, of social and political organisation was, and continues to be, 
globalised (Badie, 2000).  Rather than focusing on its supposedly imminent decline, 
                                                 
3 See, for example, proposals relating to the development of ‘Global Administrative Law’ 
(Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart 2005), and other initiatives directed towards the development 
of the accountability of non-state actors more generally (Clapham, 2006). 
4 See, for example, Orford’s genealogical account of the relationship between the 
Responsibility to Protect and the development of international executive authority (Orford, 
2011) 
5 See Hardt and Negri 2000, p. 15: ‘Empire is formed not on the basis of force itself but on the 
basis of the capacity to present force as being in the service of right and peace’. 
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we might reflect, rather, on the possibility that the state-project was never complete – 
that having been exported to the non-Western world during decolonisation, it has 
become the persistent object of a host of projects (humanitarian, political, economic 
and legal) associated with making the world into a world of nation-states, to shore 
them up, save them from ‘failure’, and mute their pathologies.  From that standpoint, 
the role of international law has not been to advance its decline, but rather to 
‘perform’ the state and produce it as an ‘effect’ of rule (Mitchell, 1999). And if that is 
the case then we should be equally concerned with material or ‘distributive’ 
consequences of that particular way of organising the world – of the forms of 
domination or exploitation it has brought in its wake, and the other ways of ‘being in 
the world’ that it has foreclosed. These are questions to which we will return 
throughout this examination which follows, beginning first with a look at the 
emergence of the ideas of statehood, recognition and self-determination between the 




At the beginning of the Fourth Edition of his influential Treatise on International 
Law, prepared for publication in 1895, shortly before his death, William Hall offered 
a succinct definition: 
‘International law consists in certain rules of conduct which modern 
civilised states regard as being binding on them in their relations 
with one another with a force comparable in nature and degree to 
that binding the conscientious person to obey the laws of his 
country, and which they also regard as being enforceable by 
appropriate means in case of infringement.’ (Hall, 1895, p.1) 
 
This statement – typical of the positivist tradition which emerged in the late-
nineteenth century (Koskenniemi, 2001) – is remarkable in several respects.  To 
begin with, there is the question of tone: this is not the beginning of an enquiry, or a 
speculation that has to be situated in some historical context.  There is no attempt to 
locate his subject in contemporary debate or practice.  This is international law 
written as science.  International law, here, is not merely a language, or a way of 
describing certain activities or practices.  It is already a thing with definite content, 
there to be described.  The content of international law was to be found, in turn, in 
rules of conduct which Sates, as a matter of fact, regarded as binding upon them.  
This definition did not rely on some anterior normative order (whether centred on 
God or the inherent rationality of ‘mankind’ as in the natural law tradition of Vattel, 
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Grotius and others). Nor did it require any attempt to engage with the complex of 
social and political relations that, over the course of centuries, had come to constitute 
the authority of each the states of the ‘Family of Nations’, such that each could indeed 
be regarded as an individual, sui generis ‘person’.  For Hall, international law was 
simply to be located in an empirical practice of consent and obligation.  At the heart 
of this practice, of course, was the ‘modern civilised state’ – in practice, the European 
or (in the Americas) neo-European state – whose actions were both the object and 
measure of this science.  One needed a community of civilised states for there to be 
rules of conduct.  And in order that their commitments should be binding, those 
states required the necessary will and a capacity to understand that those 
commitments warranted enforcement ‘by appropriate means’. Imagining the state in 
this way – essentially as a male, Western European individual subject of law ‘writ 
large’, to adopt Plato’s formation6 – and placing it at the centre of a global normative 
universe, allowed an elaborate architecture of legal rules to be described and 
generated around it. 
 
It is notable, furthermore, that in this definition, and in his Treatise more generally, 
Hall avoids the term ‘sovereignty’ almost completely, except in relation to those 
matters which were presumptively ‘internal’ such as might engage the relationship 
between the state and its subjects.  In place of the word ‘sovereignty’ when describing 
the authority, rights and duties of the state, he used the term ‘personality’. What was 
significant about this choice of language was the fact that the term ‘personality’ 
assumed the existence of a systemic order that attributed a range of competences to 
certain designated actors.  Just as a corporation might be assigned a specific set of 
legal capacities under municipal law - such as the capacity to sue and be sued - so, in 
the case of states, they would be ‘accorded’ certain capacities in international law – 
indeed, the fullest set of international rights and duties that it was possible to 
possess.  Once statehood came to be separated from ‘international personality’ in this 
way, the state was no longer understood as carrying with it certain natural rights or 
prerogatives.7 Instead, ‘the state’ was now used as a descriptive term, referring to an 
entity which possessed a specific set of ‘objective’ characteristics, and which could 
then be accorded the set of rights and duties (comprising its ‘personality’) on that 
                                                 
6 Plato’s Republic, trans. C.D.C. Reeve, Book 4, (Indianapolis, Cambridge: Hackett, 2004), p. 
121.  
7 The remainder of a such an idea is to be found in the recognition, within the UN Charter, of 
the ‘inherent’ right of self-defense. See article 51 UN Charter. 
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basis.8  In contrast to the Vattelian idea of states enjoying a natural liberty in a state 
of nature, for Hall and his colleagues this liberty of action was one ‘subject to law’ 
(Hall, 1895 p 24). 
 
At the time in which Hall was writing, nearly all treatises on international law began 
in similar manner and would be followed by one or more chapters containing an 
extemporised discussion of the state as the primary subject of international law (See 
Westlake 1904; Twiss 1884; Lawrence 1895; Wheaton 1836; Phillimore 1889; Rivier 
1896; Fiore 1890; Bonfils 1894).  Typically this section or chapter would seek to 
define what was meant by a state for purposes of international law, determine who or 
what would count for such purposes, and address matters of classification 
(distinguishing perhaps between ‘sovereign’ or ‘semi sovereign’ states, and 
identifying vassals, protectorates, condominia and unions as particular classes). 
Comment would routinely be passed on difficulties of nomenclature - debating 
whether everything called a state could be treated as a state and whether states 
differed from ‘nations’.  In the process, there would usually also be some associated 
reflections upon the notion of ‘sovereignty’ and what that might mean in the context 
of international relations, and of the putative role that ‘recognition’ might play.  Once 
in other words the issue of who the subjects of law were had been established, 
together with the framework for determining the extent and scope of their rights and 
obligations (i.e. the question of sources), those principles could then be applied to a 
range of more concrete matters such as the law of the sea, the protection of nationals 
abroad or belligerent relations.   
 
The fact that this discussion of states and their character was always the starting 
point, for these jurists, was significant in more ways than one.  In one respect, it 
reflected a new determination, on the part of ‘professional’ international lawyers, to 
ground international law in state practice and consent rather than in the inherited 
tradition of natural rights.  In another respect, however, it also illustrated the way in 
which ‘the state’ had come to supplant other ways of describing political society – 
whether that be in terms of the people, the nation, civil society, the sovereign, the 
monarch, or the multitude.  Whilst Hall, like many others, continued to use 
                                                 
8 See O’Connell, 1970, Vol I, p. 80: ‘It is clear that the word “person” is used to refer to one 
who is a legal actor, but that it is of no assistance in ascertaining who or what is competent to 
act.  Only the rules of international law may do this, and they may select different entities and 
endow them with different legal functions, so it is a mistake to suppose that merely by 
describing an entity as a “person” one is formulating its capacities in law’. 
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Bentham’s terminology in describing his subject matter (‘international law’), he no 
longer attributed any particular significance to the ‘nation’ as such. 
 
Even if Hall and others of the positivist persuasion sought to mark themselves out 
from their ‘naturalist’ intellectual predecessors, they nevertheless uniformly saw 
themselves as working in a well-established tradition with its roots in the Roman Law 
notion of the ius gentium, as subsequently received and modified through the work of 
Suarez, Ayala, Gentili, Grotius, Bynkershoek, Pufendorf, Wolff and de Vattel, among 
others.  In many respects, what seemed to tie these classic works together as a single 
tradition was twofold. In the first place, these authors all sought to identify the 
existence of a law that both transcended and bound the sovereign, whether that 
found its origin in principles derived from natural law or from the more immediate 
practice of sovereigns in their relations inter-se. Secondly, these treatises all assumed 
the existence of a plurality of sovereign subjects whose ‘external’ relations were 
regulated by the terms of this ius gentium.  A key moment in this story, as it was to be 
later narrated, was the moment at which this plurality – the ‘Family of Nations’ – was 
to appear; and without exception, that moment was identified with the birth of a 
secular international society within Europe, the inauguration of which was marked by 
the Peace of Westphalia of 1648. For it was at this point, it was argued, that a nascent 
international community finally emerged from the shadow of the Holy Roman 
Empire and from the coercive authority of the Catholic Church (Hall, 1895, pp 55-
60). 
 
The emphasis given to the Peace of Westphalia by the likes of Hall made it possible to 
think of international society straightforwardly as a society of independent sovereigns 
and their subordinates.   But this, of course, said very little about the state itself as an 
idea, or about the many transformations it underwent over the centuries. 
Machiavelli’s account in The Prince had suggested that the archetypal 16th Century 
sovereign existed, ‘in a relationship of singularity and externality, of transcendence, 
to his principality’ (Foucault, 2007, p. 91).  Since the Prince could receive his 
principality by inheritance, acquisition, conveyance or conquest, there was nothing 
but a synthetic link between the two.  The principality, including both its territory 
and population, stood in a quasi-feudal relation to the Prince’s individual authority; it 
had no separate meaning or significance.  International relations could thus be 
understood almost exclusively in terms of the rights, possessions and entitlements of 
the person of the sovereign.   
This is a draft of a chapter that has been accepted for publication by Oxford University Press in 
the forthcoming book International Law, 5th edition edited by Malcolm Evans.  
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/24772/  
 
 
By the time at which Grotius and Pufendorf were writing in mid-17th century, 
however, two new traditions of thought had started to emerge.  One of these, marked 
by invocation of the idea of the social contract (partially present in the work of 
Grotius, but given much more concrete form in the work of Hobbes and Locke a little 
further towards the end of the 1600s), sought to forge a definitive link between the 
people (understood as a community of individuals or as a ‘multitude’), and the 
sovereign (the individual or group of people who were endowed with the right to 
rule).  From this point on, those entitled to exercise the prerogatives of sovereignty 
(what we now call the ‘government’), could plausibly be separated from the place in 
which sovereignty was located (what we now associate with the ‘state’).  The other 
tradition, which was associated with the emergence of mercantilist thought in the 17th 
Century, began conceptualising the territory and people in terms of a unit of 
economic activity (Foucault, 2007).  Since sovereignty, as Locke in particular was to 
aver, was underpinned by the appropriation and use of land,9 the idea developed that 
the exercise of sovereign rights ought to be oriented in that direction: the people 
should be governed (put to work) and not merely ruled.  This involved not only 
bringing the population as a productive resource within the boundaries of 
governmental action (e.g. through the regulation of migration and vagrancy and the 
introduction of ‘poor laws’). It also pointed to a concern for the maximisation of the 
productive output of land. In Europe, this led to the forcible ‘clearing’ of traditional 
land-holdings. Outside Europe, it legitimised the creation of new settler colonies on 
the grounds that the so-called ‘savages’ of the ‘new world’ had failed to appropriate 
and use the land they inhabited productively, and therefore had no legal claim over it 
(see e.g. Bhandar, 2014).    
 
Central to the development, in the 17th Century, of this new ‘art of government’ 
(raison d’état as it became known), was an idea of the ‘state’ that had both objective 
and subjective characteristics.  In an objective sense, the state was increasingly 
coming to be understood in terms of a set of identifiable characteristics (later to be 
understood as ‘criteria’), including territory, population and government (Elden, 
2013) and yet which assumed an identity that was somehow greater than, or at least 
independent of, the sum of its parts.  Governments might come and go, for example, 
                                                 
9 Locke, Second Treatise of Government 1690 pp. 18-30. See also Vattel, The Law of Nations 
pp. 37-8: ‘The whole earth is designed to furnish sustenance for its inhabitants; but it cannot 
do this unless it be cultivated. Every Nation is therefore bound by the natural law to cultivate 
the land which has fallen to its share’. 
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but the state, so long as it retained the core elements, would remain the same.  In a 
subjective sense, on the other hand, the state was increasingly understood as 
possessing some immanent end – whether that was simply to maintain common 
peace and security, or further the cause of society.  Both of these strands of thought 
came neatly to be expressed in Pufendorf’s definition of the state as a ‘compound 
Moral person, whose will being united and tied together by those covenants which 
before passed amongst the multitude, is deemed the will of all, to the end that it may 
use and apply the strength and riches of private persons towards maintaining the 
common peace and security’. (Pufendorf, On the Law of Nature and Nations, Bk VII, 
c. 2, s. 13).   
 
A significant feature of Pufendorf’s definition, here – anticipated in Hobbes’ 
description of the Leviathan – was the personification of the state as a moral entity in 
its own right.  To describe the state as a ‘person’ in this way had several obvious 
consequences.  In the first instance, it encouraged the ascription to the state of 
certain passions, interests, and motivations that went beyond the strictly 
instrumental task of preserving peace and good order, or defending the realm from 
external attack. As Wolff would later argue, for example, the state was duty-bound to 
seek its own ‘self-perfection’ by maximising its wealth and prestige – a task which 
necessitated the development of new systems of knowledge (statistics) and the 
bureaucratic organisation of social and economic affairs to that end (police). In the 
second place, the move towards personifying the state also encouraged the 
development, in the hands of Vattel in particular, of what has become known as the 
‘domestic analogy’ in which states were to be understood as being in a position 
analogous to individuals prior to the establishment of civil society, seeking security 
and community in their relations with others.  For Vattel, thus, states existed in a 
state of nature, enjoying the same rights ‘as nature gives to men for the fulfilment of 
their duties’ (Vattel, 1758 p 4) and such natural liberties as befitted their character.  
The law of nations provided the structure by which that freedom and equality was to 
be preserve and promoted within the frame of a wider international society. 
 
In many respects, it is difficult to underestimate the enduring significance of Vattel’s 
appealingly simplistic account of the state in international relations.   However far 
international thought may have moved, today, away from the idea of states enjoying 
certain natural prerogatives, or of sovereignty being sharply demarcated between 
internal and external domains, the idea that the world could be described in terms of 
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states as a sociological category of ‘person’, possessing a distinct ‘will’, ‘mentality’, or 
‘motivation’ that may encourage them to interact with one another in certain 
determinate ways is one that endures to this day. This no more clearly demonstrated 
than in the ‘rational choice’ analytics that is deployed, in some quarters, to detail the 
process and efficacy of international law today (e.g. Goldsmith and Posner (2006)).  
 
Nevertheless, for those, like Hall, receiving this tradition in the 19th Century, there 
were always evident complexities that had to be negotiated.  To begin with, it was not 
exactly easy to translate this monadic description of international society as a society 
of ‘free and independent’ nations into practice at the time. Writing in the middle of 
the Century, for example, Phillimore was to identify eleven different categories of 
state, four of which were ‘peculiar’ cases (Poland, Belgium, Greece and Egypt), the 
rest of which included, in addition to states under one sovereign, two categories of 
Unions, states that took the form of Free Towns or Republics, Tribute-paying states 
(Vassals) and two further categories of states under different forms of Protectorate. 
Further to this, there was the complex phenomenon of the German Confederation (a 
loose alliance of 70 independent ‘states’) to be explained (Phillimore, 1871, p. 101).  
This was, on no account, a uniform scheme of political organization.  
 
Adding to the complexity, by the end of the 19th Century, international lawyers were 
increasingly concerned as to how their received tradition of sovereignty might apply 
to the non-European world (a concern that was taken up explicitly in 1879 by the 
newly-formed Institut de Droit International10).   The problem faced by the Institut’s 
members was this: in their desire to avoid the abstract rationalism of natural law and 
locate international rights and obligations instead in the empiricism of practice and 
custom, international lawyers had come to speak about international law in 
specifically European terms.  At a time at which the idea of the nation as a cultural 
and linguistic community was emerging in a specifically political form (demanding an 
alignment between nation and state), it seemed obvious that the international 
relations of such a community of nation-states would be imbued with, or built upon, 
the same consciousness of history and tradition.  Custom seemed to imply some kind 
of social consensus, and consensus a commonality of understanding and outlook 
(what Westlake referred to as a ‘juridical consciousness’) that could only readily be 
supposed in relation to ‘civilised’ communities in Europe (or those communities of 
‘European origin’ elsewhere).  For some, in fact, international law was actually more 
                                                 
10 Twiss, (1879-1880) p. 301. See generally Koskenniemi, 2001, 98-178. 
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properly described as the Public Law of Europe, as in the work of those such as 
Martens (1864) and Klüber (1851). 
 
Yet for all this, international lawyers in the 19th century were also aware of the long 
history of treaty-making with all manner of local sovereigns in Asia, Africa and 
elsewhere, the form of which seemed to suppose that those relations were to be 
governed by the terms of international law (see Alexandrowicz 1967, Anghie 2005).  
Indeed, the fact that from the early 1880s onwards European exploration of the 
interior of Africa was to be marked, amongst other things, by the systematic and 
widespread conclusion of treaties with local kings and chiefs providing for 
‘protection’ or for the cession of sovereignty only made the issue more pressing.  How 
might an exclusively European system of public law conceive of such arrangements? 
And what might this imply as regards the status of those communities? 
 
It was at this point that the language of ‘civilisation’ (Said, 1978) was to invest itself in 
the realm of law. Although few international lawyers at the time explicitly introduced 
into their definitions of the state a requirement that they be ‘civilised’,11 the existence 
of an implicit ‘standard of civilisation’ ran throughout most their work in relation to 
recognition or territorial title, or when describing the character of international law 
(Gong 1985, Anghie 2005).  Thus, for example, whilst Hall spoke in quite abstract 
terms about the ‘marks of an independent state’ (being permanently established for a 
political end, possessing a defined territory and being independent of external 
control) he was still to make clear that international law consisted of those rules of 
conduct which ‘modern civilised states’ regarded as being binding upon them. (Hall, 
1895 p. 1) One could not, in other words, assume that simply because there existed 
treaty relations with non-European states such as China or Japan, that those latter 
states were to be regarded as having the same rights and privileges as European 
states.  As Lawrence was to note: 
‘there are many communities outside the sphere of International 
Law, though they are independent states.  They neither grant to 
others, nor claim form themselves the strict observance of its rules.  
Justice and humanity should be scrupulously adhered to in all 
dealings with them, but they are not fit subjects for the application 
of legal technicalities.  It would, for instance, be absurd to expect 
the king of Dahomey to establish a Prize Court, or to require the 
dwarfs of the central African forest to receive a permanent 
diplomatic mission’ (Lawrence, 1895, p 58).   
                                                 
11 See e.g. Phillimore, 1871, p 94.  Occasionally, the point was made more explicit.  See 
Westlake, 1984, pp 102-3; Lawrence, 1895, p 58. 
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By and large, thus, international lawyers began to differentiate in their accounts 
between those ‘normal’ relations that pertained between European states and those 
that characterised relations with other political communities on the outside.  Beyond 
Europe, the treaties that put in place regimes of protection or for consular 
jurisdiction and extraterritoriality, or those that purported to ‘cede’ territory, took the 
form of agreements between sovereign states; their substance, however, was to deny 
any such pretension. 
 
Yet there was a difficulty here.  Even if non-European states did not possess a 
sovereignty equivalent to that of European states, to deny them status of any kind 
would have put in question the validity of the agreements – treaties of cession, 
boundary agreements, concessions and so on – upon which European privileges 
seemed to depend (Koskenniemi, 2005, pp 136-143; Anghie, 2004, pp 76-82).  Some 
position within the broader framework of international law therefore had to be found 
for them; they had to be simultaneously included yet excluded from the realm of 
international law.12 Some jurists responded by differentiating between legal relations, 
as might exist between European states, and non-legal, moral or ethical, propositions 
that were said to govern relations with the non-civilised world (Westlake, 1894, pp 
137-40). Others made a distinction between states enjoying full membership and 
those enjoying merely partial membership in the family of nations (Wheaton 1866, 
Oppenheim 1905). Still others drew a line between ‘plenary’ and partial recognition 
(Lorimer, 1883, pp 101-123).  There was agreement on one point, however, namely 
that in order to be admitted into the family of nations, those aspirant states had to 
demonstrate their ‘civilised’ credentials.  To be ‘civilised’ furthermore, largely meant 
the creation of institutions of government, law and administration modelled upon 
those found in Western Europe (Westlake, pp 141-3; Mill, 1859, pp 161-3).  This was a 
message fully understood in Japan, whose rapid process of ‘Westernization’ in the 
latter half of the 19th Century eventually allowed it to rid itself of the regimes of 
consular jurisdiction that had been put in place in order to insulate Western 
merchants and traders from the application of local law.  Only once this ‘badge of 
                                                 
12 Schmitt, 1974, p 233, examining Rivier’s Lehrbuch des Volkerrechts (1889) notes that his 
overview of ‘current sovereign states’ included 25 states in Europe, 19 in the Americas, then 
‘states in Africa’ including the Congo Free state, the Free state of Liberia, the Orange Free 
state, the Sultanate of Morocco and the Sultanate of Zanzibar.  Schmitt notes that in respect of 
the latter category these were called states but the word sovereign was avoided and in case of 
Morocco and Zanzibar, Rivier had noted that ‘obviously’ they did ‘not belong to the 
community of international law’.  Schmitt asks pithily: ‘Why were they even included in the 
enumeration?’ 
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imperfect membership’ had been removed was Japan understood to have become a 
full member of international society (Westlake, 1894, p 46).13  
 
These assumptions, it has to be said, by no means disappeared overnight – if they can 
be said to have disappeared at all.  In the wake of the First World War, many of them 
were remodelled and given institutional form under the League of Nations.  Article 
38(3) of the statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, for example, 
referred to ‘the general principles of law recognized by civilised nations’ -- a phrase 
that was incorporated directly, in 1945, into the present statute of the ICJ at Article 
38(1)(c).  The theme was maintained even more explicitly in the institutions of the 
Mandate system designed, by the League, to deal with the situation of the colonies 
and territories extracted from Germany and the Ottoman empire under the terms of 
the various peace treaties.  Under Article 22 of the Covenant of the League, ‘advanced 
nations’ (viz Britain, France, Belgium, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and 
Japan) were entrusted with the task of exercising ‘tutelage’ on behalf of the League 
over those colonies and territories described as ‘inhabited by peoples not yet able to 
stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world’.  The 
purpose of this ‘sacred trust’ was to advance the ‘well-being and development of such 
peoples’, with the precise implications of this phrase depending on a classification set 
out within that same article.  Certain territories (designated as ‘Class A’ Mandates) 
were regarded as having ‘reached a stage of development where their existence as 
independent nations can be provisionally recognized’, in which case the Mandatory 
Power was to provide administrative advice and assistance ‘until such time as they 
are able to stand alone’.  This category included those territories in the Middle East 
separated from the Ottoman Empire (Iraq, Palestine and Transjordan, Syria and 
Lebanon).  ‘Class B’ territories (those in Africa with the exception of South-West 
Africa) were to be subject to significantly more intensive degrees of administrative 
control without any explicit expectation of independence, and ‘Class C’ territories 
(Pacific Islands and South West Africa) were those declared to be ‘best administered 
under the laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of its territory’, subject to 
                                                 
13 A contrast might be drawn here with the rather slower progress made in the case of China. 
The Nine Power Treaty of 1922 sought to guarantee the ‘Open Door’ policy in China (by which 
was meant ‘equality of opportunity in China for the trade and industry of all nations’) to be 
secured by barring any agreement that might secure special commercial privileges for any one 
state.  A special Commission was set up to examine the question as to whether the 
continuation of extraterritorial privileges was justified.  It reported back in 1926 concluding 
that although progress had been made, more was needed before such regimes could be 
suspended. See Summary and Recommendations of the Report of the Commission on 
Extraterritoriality in China, 1926, in (1927) 21 AJIL, Supplement 58. 
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certain safeguards ‘in the interests of the indigenous population’ (see Anghie, 2005, 
pp 115-195). 
 
Whilst, as Schwarzenberger suggested, the Mandate system came very close to being 
a mechanism for the continuation of colonialism ‘by other means’ (Schwarzenberger 
1950, p. 134), the very decision to employ ‘other means’ was significant.  To begin 
with, the institution of international trusteeship seemed to make clear that Mandate 
powers were not acquiring such territories as ‘colonies’, and therefore could not be 
taken to enjoy the normal rights of sovereignty in relation to such territories.  But if 
that was the case, it posed the obvious question as to where sovereignty lay? (Wright, 
1930).  The territories themselves, could barely be described as sovereign in their own 
right, as otherwise the restrictions on their independence would have been 
inexplicable.  Some other status had to be devised for them, or at least some language 
that avoided the problematic implications of the notion of ‘sovereignty’.   This, of 
course, was not a problem solely related to the institution of the Mandate, but was 
equally relevant to the authority exercised by the League of Nations itself – how 
might its powers be described within an international order comprising of sovereign 
states? 
 
Whether or not as a consequence of reflecting upon such problems, international 
lawyers writing at the time of the League began to regard the notion of sovereignty 
and its correlates (sovereign equality and domestic jurisdiction), not as something 
integral to their understanding of international law, but rather as an obstacle to be 
overcome.  For many, a fixation with the idea of sovereignty as both indicative of the 
absence of any higher authority, and as the source of law (understood, perhaps, in 
Austinian terms as the command of the sovereign) had not only left the discipline in a 
condition of internal contradiction,14 but ill-equipped to deal with a world of new 
international institutions and novel forms of governance.  Writing in 1928, for 
example, Brierly joined the emerging chorus, dismissing the idea of sovereignty as ‘an 
idolon theatre’ that bore little relation to the way in which states and other 
‘international persons’ related to one another in practice (Brierly, 1924, p 13).  If 
‘sovereignty’ was to be retained as an idea it had to undergo nothing less than a 
                                                 
14 Kennedy, 1997, p. 114 associates a scepticism of sovereignty with positivism: ‘To fulfil their 
polemical mission, to render plausible a legal order among sovereigns, the philosophy which 
sets this question, which makes sovereigns absolute or requires a sovereign for legal order, 
must be tempered, if not rejected.  As a result, to inherit positivism is also to inherit a 
tradition of response to the scepticism and deference to absolute state authority, which 
renders legal order among sovereigns implausible in the first place’. 
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conceptual transformation. One place in which the contours of such a transformation 
can be discerned is in the Wimbledon case, which came before the PCIJ in 1923. The 
case dealt with a claim made by Germany that the granting of an unfettered right of 
passage to vessels of all nationalities through the Kiel canal – a right stemming from 
the punitive terms of the Treaty of Versailles, concluded between German and the 
Allied and Associated Powers at the end of the First World War – would ‘imply the 
abandonment by Germany of a personal and imprescriptible right, which forms an 
essential part of her sovereignty’. The Court responded by stating that it: 
‘decline[d] to see in the conclusion of any Treaty by which a State  
undertakes to perform or refrain from performing a particular act 
an abandonment of its sovereignty.  No doubt any convention 
creating an obligation of this kind places a restriction on the 
exercise of sovereign rights of the State, in the sense that it requires 
them to be exercised in a certain way.  But the right of entering into 
international engagements is an attribute of State sovereignty.’15 
 
Sovereignty, in other words, was not to be understood as an unfettered freedom from 
external constraint, but rather as a way of describing a capacity for binding others to, 
and being bound by, international law.  It was no longer something that had any 
innate content (such as describing certain natural rights or prerogatives), nor 
something that could be raised as an objection to those obligations once entered 
into.16  It was merely a way of describing those remaining powers and liberties 
afforded to the state under international law.    
 
This new way of thinking was undoubtedly helpful in several respects.  To begin with, 
it allowed a dissociation between the possession of ‘sovereign rights’ on the one hand 
and the actual order of power on the other. This meant that territories under 
belligerent occupation,17 subject to a treaty of Protection or placed under the 
administration of a Mandatory power, for instance, could be conceived as being 
subject to the governmental authority of another state, yet not part of its territorial 
sovereignty.  Sovereignty in such cases survived in suspended form.  It also disposed 
of the problem of sovereign equality and domestic jurisdiction: states could regard 
themselves as equal, so long as it was clear that ‘equality’ meant an equal capacity to 
enjoy rights and bear obligations.  They also retained a right of domestic jurisdiction 
so far as this described a residual domain of freedom left untrammelled by the 
                                                 
15 S.S. ‘Wimbledon’, Judgments, 1923, PCIJ Rep., Series A., No. 1 at p. 25. 
16 See also Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v 
United states of America), Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, p 14, para 131: ‘A state… is 
sovereign for purposes of accepting a limitation of its sovereignty’. 
17 See article 43 Hague Regulations (1907) 
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constraints of external obligation.18  It was only a short move from here to the 
position adopted by Kelsen, amongst others, who came to the conclusion that states 
were nothing but legal orders, described fully and completely in terms of propositions 
of law.19  
 
However, this determination to formalise statehood and functionalise sovereignty 
coexisted uneasily with the normative zeitgeist of the post-WW1 era – namely the 
principle of ‘national self-determination’. This principle, advanced by President 
Woodrow Wilson, in particular, in 1918 (see below), implied a substantive conception 
of the state rooted in ideas of community and cultural homogeneity, determined for 
the most part by religious or linguistic markers.  The sovereignty that this idea 
demanded – a sovereignty realised most concretely in new system of ‘national states’ 
and ‘national minorities’ set up in Eastern Europe – was not one that could be 
regulated from outside, but that inhered in a determinate people with values and 
interests that required protection and advancement. Ironically, these simultaneous 
currents – the promotion of national self-determination and the juridification of 
sovereignty – left legal doctrine in much the same bind as it had found itself half a 
century before at the height of the positivist reaction against natural law theory. 
Systematically cut through by an opposition between two ideas of statehood (one 
formal, the other substantive) and two ideas of sovereignty (one innate, the other 
attributed or delegated), neither of which could attain ascendency, inter-war jurists 
within the West, found it no less impossible to avoid the trap of analytical 
contradiction than their teachers had done (Koskenniemi, 1989, pp. 59-60, 224-233).  
This opposition, as we shall see, was to continue to infect the mainstream discussion 
of statehood through the period of decolonisation and on into the new millennium – 
its presence being felt in debates as to the relationship between self-determination 
and uti possidetis (whether ‘people’ determined the territory, or the territory the 
people) and, of course, in discussions over the implications of recognition (whether it 
was ‘constitutive or ‘declaratory’). The key observation here, however, is not simply to 
note the pervasiveness of a set of contradictory undercurrents that underpin the legal 
                                                 
18 See e.g., Nationality Decrees in Tunis and Morocco, Advisory opinion, 1923, PCIJ Rep., 
Series B., No. 4, p. 24: ‘The question whether a certain matter is or is not solely within the 
jurisdiction of a state is an essentially relative question; it depends upon the development of 
international relations.’ 
19 Kelsen, 1942, pp 64-5: ‘The State is not its individuals; it is the specific union of individuals, 
and this union is the function of the order which regulates their mutual behaviour… One of 
the distinctive results of the pure theory of law is its recognition that the coercive order which 
constitutes the political community we call a state, is a legal order.  What is usually called the 
legal order of the state, or the legal order set up by the state, is the state itself.’ 
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formation of statehood in international law, but to note that many of these 
contradictions were to appear for a particular reason – that this was the means by 
which European statehood could be globalised and made the universal mode of 
political organization and emancipation.  They express, in other words, how the state 
comes to be positioned as both an object of desire as well as a presupposition of the 




III.  DEFINING AND RECOGNISING THE STATE 
 
One of the most concrete manifestations of the shift in legal thought described above 
– from the idea of states existing in a Vattelian state of nature between whom a thin 
architecture of legal relations came to be established, to one in which states were 
understood to exist as legal entities endowed with certain competences by 
international law – can be found in the increasing concern to identify those ‘marks’ or 
‘criteria’ by which statehood could be measured.  For Vattel and other natural law 
scholars, describing or defining the state was primarily a matter of trying to capture 
the plurality of different kinds of political communities existing in Europe in the 
middle of the 18th Century. For those undertaking the same exercise 100 or 200 years 
later, however, the project of description had taken on a different character, 
concerning itself less with describing and indexing those communities that existed, as 
a matter of sociological fact, and more with the task of prescribing how much 
sovereignty – how much ‘international personality’ in the form of rights and duties – 
they should enjoy.  
 
One result of this shift in emphasis was that the terms of description became more 
explicitly exclusionary as time went by.  Thus, when Wheaton in 1866 endorsed 
Cicero’s classic definition of the state as ‘a body political, or society of men, united 
together for the purpose of promoting their mutual safety or advantage by their 
combined strength’ he also took trouble to specify what entities were not included in 
this category. It did not include, as far as he was concerned, corporations created by 
the state itself, for instance, nor ‘voluntary associations of robbers or pirates’, nor 
‘unsettled horde[s] of wandering savages’, nor indeed nations since the state ‘may be 
composed of different races of men’ (Wheaton 1866, s. 17). Oppenheim’s 1905 
definition – much closer to the definition which the signatories of Montevideo 
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Convention on the Rights and Duties of States settled on in 1933 (see below) - was 
similarly exclusionary in nature. ‘A State proper’, he wrote, ‘is in existence when a 
people is settled in a country under its own Sovereign Government’. By this definition 
‘[a] wandering people, such as the Jews were while in the desert for forty years… is 
not a State’. Likewise ‘[a]n anarchistic community’ would be excluded from statehood 
by its lack of a government; and ‘so-called Colonial States’ were excluded by their lack 
of ‘sovereignty’, a term that referred to ‘independence all round, within and without 
the borders of the country’ (Oppenheim, 1905, pp. 100-01).  The definition of the 
state thus became a vehicle not merely for purposes of description (providing an 
analytical framework for understanding the character of international society for 
purposes of law) but also for purposes of distinguishing between those political 
communities that might properly be regarded as subjects of international law and 
those that would not.   For some, this shift in orientation was decisive.  As O’Connell 
was later to suggest (1970 p 81): ‘the proposition “France is a State” is not a 
description or a definition but merely a conclusion to a train of legal reasoning’. 
 
This shift from fact to law (or, if you prefer, from description to prescription) was, 
nevertheless, to have a particular context.  In the first half of the 19th century a series 
of revolutionary wars had inspired a number of independence movements around the 
world (Belgium, Greece, Haiti, Mexico, Chile, and a host of other Latin American 
republics) in which claims to statehood grounded in the ‘mere fact’ of their 
independence  were routinely opposed by the former colonial powers. In this context, 
international lawyers began to turn to the doctrine of recognition (a doctrine that had 
previously been employed largely for purposes of identifying a condition of 
belligerency or insurgency). Even if the independent existence of states was merely a 
question of fact, they reasoned, it was difficult to judge the legitimacy of such claims 
except by reference to the competing claims of other states.  In case of secession, for 
example, it was understood that to recognise a new state before the moment at which 
it had fully established its independence was not merely to offend the sensibilities of 
the state attempting to suppress the rebellion, but constituted also an act of unlawful 
intervention. This encouraged a differentiation between the existence of states 
understood in terms of their internal effectiveness, and the question of their 
membership in the wider international community which would be determined by 
the practice of recognition.  Wheaton (1866, s. 21, p. 28) distinguished, thus, between 
internal and external sovereignty for such purposes:  
‘So long, indeed, as the new State confines its action to its own 
citizens, and to the limits of its own territory, it may well dispense 
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with such recognition.  But if it desires to enter into that great 
society of nations, all the members of which recognize rights to 
which they are mutually entitled, and duties which they may be 
called upon reciprocally to fulfil, such recognition becomes 
essentially necessary to the complete participation of the new State 
in all the advantages of this society.’   
 
What this distinction immediately suggested was that questions of status, on 
the one hand, and of participation in international society on the other, were 
ultimately separable, with the practice of recognition being relevant to the latter, but 
not the former.  The ensuing hypothesis that there might be states which possessed 
‘internal sovereignty’, but yet which did not participate in the ‘great society of 
nations’ found, furthermore, concrete expression in the postulated divide between 
the European and non-European worlds at the time.  This allowed European 
international lawyers at the time to acknowledge and rationalize the existence of the 
Ottoman, Chinese, Japanese and Ethiopian Empires, for example, as independent 
political communities, without needing to accept that they were, as a consequence, 
subjects of international law in the fullest sense. As non-European jurists well 
understood, however (see Becker Lorca, 2015), this new ‘constitutive’ doctrine of 
recognition gave those states whose sovereignty was not in question an immense 
degree of power in determining whether ‘outsiders’ should be allowed ‘within the pale 
of those rights and duties, which civilised Nations are… entitled reciprocally to claim 
from each other’, as the British foreign secretary, George Canning put it (quoted in 
Grewe, 2000, p. 499).20 It was here that the ‘standard of civilisation’ came into its 
own as an instrument of international law. In addition to having failed to organise 
themselves collectively in such a way as to resemble states in an ‘objective’ sense, 
‘savage tribes’, having been judged incapable of comprehending the rules of 
international law, could also be denied recognition. This judgement was usually 
based on their alleged inability to comprehend the rules of international law, and 
presumed incapacity, therefore, to ‘reciprocate’ any such recognition (Lorimer, 1883-
84, p 117). By contrast, entities like the Chinese Empire which did, up to a point, 
seem state-like in their appearance, could, it was agreed, be ‘partially’ recognised, and 
hence granted some but not all the rights associated with sovereign statehood 
(Westlake, 1914, p 82).  
                                                 
20 Wheaton, 1866, s. 21: ‘until such recognition becomes universal on the part of the other 
States, the new State becomes entitled to the exercise of its external sovereignty as to those 
states only by whom that sovereignty has been recognized.’); Lorimer, p. 106 (‘Though 
recognition is often spoken of as admission into the family of nations, it leaves the State which 
has claimed and obtained it from one State only, in the same position in which it formerly 
stood to every other State’. 
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Whilst this 19th Century practice, however, seemed to rely upon a differentiation 
between the question of sovereign status on the one hand and that of participation in 
the international community on the other, it was always clear that the ultimate 
objective was to achieve congruence between the two.  What was ultimately envisaged 
was a truly global system of inter-state law governed by the principles of sovereign 
equality and territorial integrity.  And so far as that was the objective, participation 
within that system could not remain dependent upon the benevolence or discretion of 
imperial powers, but would have to be conditioned upon the pure fact of a state’s 
independent existence.  In the early 20th Century, thus, international lawyers began 
to distance themselves from what they saw to be the 19th Century ‘constitutive’ 
approach to recognition and embraced, instead, a ‘declaratory’ approach the gist of 
which was to declare that a state would exist for purposes of international law at the 
moment in which it existed ‘in fact’.  This indeed, was the platform adopted by 
members of the Pan-American Union when they came to draft was is now taken to be 
the seminal definition of statehood in the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and 
Duties of States in 1933.  There, they insisted that the ‘political existence of the state’ 
– which they took to be entities possessed of a permanent population, defined 
territory, government and a capacity to enter relation with other states – ‘is 
independent of recognition by other states’. ‘Even before recognition’ article 3 
provides, ‘the state has the right to defend its integrity and independence, to provide 
for its conservation and prosperity, and consequently to organize itself as it sees fit, to 
legislate upon its interests, administer its services, and to define the jurisdiction and 
competence of its courts’. 
 
If the authors of the Montevideo Convention clearly aspired to eliminate the role of 
recognition as a determinant in the enjoyment of the prerogatives of sovereignty, they 
nevertheless left on the table the question as to how one might conceive the existence 
of the state for such purposes – was it a mere pre-supposition of international law? 
Or rather a legally-determined status?  Were the criteria legal or factual?  And how 
might one understand the relationship between the two?  The title of Crawford’s 
influential book on the subject, The Creation of States in International Law, would 
appear to attribute a decisively constitutive role to international law in this question. 
The obvious objection, as suggested above, is that states are clearly not ‘created’ by 
international law in the same sense that a cabinet maker might craft a piece of 
furniture. Rather, they emerge through sustained political action and agitation – 
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frequently violent – in which political independence is wrested from forces sustaining 
the political status quo. Indeed, international lawyers (Crawford included) are aware 
of as much, and routinely place emphasis upon the importance of ‘effectiveness on 
the ground’, so to speak, for purposes of determining the existence or otherwise of a 
state. This would seem to suggest, accordingly, that the role of law is, in practice, 
almost entirely ex post facto; indeed, that that ‘sovereignty’ itself should be 
understood as ‘a political fact for which no purely legal authority can be constituted’ 
(Wade, 1955, p. 196).   
 
In giving his book this title, however, Crawford was not being naïve.  What he was 
arguing against was an exclusively ‘empirical’ notion of statehood.  For, as he points 
out, however important ‘effectiveness’ might be, a state is not, as he puts it, ‘a fact in 
the sense that a chair is a fact’; rather, it is ‘a legal status attaching to a certain state of 
affairs by virtue of certain rules or practices’ (Crawford, 2006, p. 5).  A closer analogy 
therefore might be the status of ‘criminality’, which is generated through the 
institutions and structures of the criminal law, or that of ‘insanity’, formed through 
the discipline of psychiatry (Foucault, 2006).  Just as ‘thief’ is a designation 
appropriate only once it has been determined that the person concerned has 
unlawfully appropriated the property of another, so the label ‘state’ makes little sense 
unless the legal framework within which the powers and competences associated with 
statehood, and the manner in which they can be acquired, has already been 
determined (Kelsen, 1942). Both ‘fact’ and ‘law’ play a role, in other words, and 
‘effectiveness’, as the summative expression of those facts deemed to be legally 
relevant, is understood to act as the hinge between the two.  
 
Crawford’s assumption here that it is the legal order that accords ‘statehood’ to those 
entities that possess the requisite characteristics tends largely to depend upon the 
hypothesis that states are constituted through essentially consensual processes.  The 
emergence of 12 new Republics out of the defunct Soviet Union in the early 1990s, for 
example, posed relatively few problems on this score for the simple reason that 
Russia had effectively renounced, in the Alma Ata Declaration and Minsk Accord,21 
any legal interest or claims to sovereignty over those regions (Mullerson, 1993).  
Here, one could conceive of the parent state either ‘delegating’ sovereign authority to 
the nascent regimes, or simply creating the necessary legal ‘space’ through the 
                                                 
21 Agreement Establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States (Minsk Accord), 8  Dec. 
1991, 31 ILM (1992) 143; Alma Ata Declaration, 21st Dec. 1991, ibid, p. 148. 
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evacuation of its own claim to sovereignty, allowing the new states then to assert their 
rights over the territories and populations concerned.22  In similar manner, one 
might also understand the process of decolonisation to have been enabled through 
the ‘suspension’ of metropolitan states’ claims to sovereignty over Non-Self-
Governing territories, which thereby created the necessary space for the exercise of 
‘self-determination’ (see below).  
 
Yet in many cases the issue is not one of the consensual devolution of sovereign 
authority (viz the granting of independence) but rather of the assertion of a new 
claim to statehood, out of a condition of dispute or conflict.  Whatever legal rules 
might be put in place, in a world already fully demarcated in terms of sovereign 
jurisdiction (in which there are no longer any ‘white spaces on [the] map’ (Nesiah, 
2003) within which new states might emerge) the process of ‘creation’ can only be 
achieved by way of displacing in some manner the prior claims to sovereignty of 
another, already-existing state. In that sense, unless existing claims to territorial 
sovereignty are lifted or suspended in some way, the emergence of a new state cannot 
be achieved without some measure of illegality.   
 
It was always evident, of course, that if states were to be regarded as actors endowed 
with personality by a superordinating legal order, it was necessary to set out 
somewhere the terms under which this ‘attribution’ of authority might take place and 
the consequences of it. Strange as it may seem, however, the process of codifying the 
rights and duties of states has never been completed to any satisfactory degree.  In 
1949 the United Nations’ International Law Commission (ILC) did produce a Draft 
Declaration on the Rights and Duties of States,23 which went some way towards 
summarising what the legal implications of statehood might be. Even though this 
draft was not, in the end, adopted by the General Assembly, it remains the most 
complete attempt to summarise the relationship between statehood and personality.  
Alongside a list of ten duties the Draft Declaration includes four rights: ‘the right to 
independence and hence to exercise freely, without dictation by any other States, all 
its legal powers, including the choice of its own form of government’ (Article 1), ‘the 
                                                 
22 One may note here, that the answer often depends upon the stance adopted in relation to 
the role of recognition.  See e.g. Hall, 1895, p. 88: ‘Of course recognition by a parent state, by 
implying an abandonment of all pretensions over the insurgent community, is more 
conclusive evidence of independence than recognition by a third power, and it removes all 
doubt from the minds of other governments as to the propriety of recognition by themselves; 
but it is not a gift of independence; it is only an acknowledgement that the claim made by the 
community to have definitively established its independence’. 
23 GA Resn. 375(VI), 6th Dec. 1949, Annex. 
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right to exercise jurisdiction over its territory and over all persons and things therein, 
subject to the immunities recognized by international law’ (Article 2), the duty of 
non-intervention in the affairs of other states (Article 3), the right to ‘equality in law 
with every other State’ (Article 5), and the ‘right of individual and collective self-
defence against armed attack’ (Article 12). Each of these does indeed seem to describe 
powers possessed only by states – to which may be added, perhaps, a plenary 
competence to perform legal acts such as conclude treaties; a right not to be subject 
to compulsory international process or dispute settlement without consent; and the 
benefit of a presumption that states enjoy an ‘unlimited freedom’ subject only to 
those constraints determined by law (the ‘Lotus’ principle) (Crawford, 2006, pp 40-
41).  Taken together, these may give some indication as to why statehood remains 
such an attractive proposition for oppressed peoples and territories in particular - 
from the Irish to the Albanian population of Kosovo, and from the Palestinians to the 
Sahrawi and the Rohingyas. 
 
Whilst drafting the Declaration, the International Law Commission also briefly 
discussed the merits of seeking a new definition of the state for purposes of 
international law.  The general reaction, at that time, was that such a project was 
either unnecessary as being self-evident, or indeed too controversial (the concern 
being that it would only have salience as regards ‘new’ rather than ‘old’ states). In 
part at least it was informed by the fact that the Pan American Union had already 
drafted the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Article 1 of 
which set out a basic definition which, if not definitive, could be taken as the starting 
point for most discussions of territorial status.  Article 1 provides as follows: 
 
‘The State as a person of international law should possess the following 
qualifications: 
(a) a permanent population; 
(b) a defined territory; 
(c) government; and 
(d) capacity to enter into relations with other states.’ 
 
For all its significance, given that article 1 is, in effect, all we have in terms of an 
accepted definition of statehood, its precise implications remain obscure.  In the first 
place, the ‘capacity to enter into relations with other states’ seems to be a conclusion 
rather a starting point, and there is no mention of other putatively relevant matters 
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such as independence, legitimacy, democracy or self-determination.  Precisely what 
article 1 ‘declares’, furthermore, requires some interpretive work.  As a legal 
prescription, its terms appear to be either too abstract or too strict.  They are too 
abstract in the sense that to say that an entity claiming to be a state needs to be able 
to declare itself as having people, territory and a form of government is really to say 
very little, and certainly does nothing to guide responses to claims by aspirant states 
such as Chechnya, Kosovo, Northern Cyprus, Palestine or Catalonia.  Certainly it may 
exclude Wheaton’s private corporation or his nomadic society, but one may ask what 
else? And to what end?   
 
Analytically, the definition would seem to require one of two things: either a 
quantitative measure of intensity (so instead of merely necessitating the existence of 
a people, a territory and something that describes itself as a government, it requires 
that these qualities are possessed in sufficient degree), or a qualitative measure (so 
that claims to statehood must be justified on the basis of some external standard, by 
responding to a principle of self-determination, for example, or being capable of 
substantiation without impinging upon the rights and duties of other sovereign 
states).   But both of these measures – of intensity and justification – seem then to 
demand too much. The measure of intensity seems to require the articulation of a 
‘threshold’ evaluation the establishment of which would be to deny the very ‘factual’ 
character that it seeks to express – who could say in advance, without lapse into 
arbitrariness, how much territory, or how many people, are required in order to 
create a state?  Surely what would matter is whether it is capable of surviving as an 
independent state, and that, presumably, is something to be determined after the fact 
so to speak.  The measure of justification has a similar problem; it seems to rely upon 
the prior establishment of internationally recognized regimes of entitlement and 
responsibility (recognised claims over territory or rights in relation to nationals) the 
validity of which would assume that the state as a legal subject is already in existence.   
In either case, the problem is how one moves from fact to law, or from cognition of 
the existence of something that calls itself a state to its legal recognition without, in a 
sense, assuming that the thing being offered the imprimatur of ‘legality’ is not 
somehow already legally existent. Let us now look in more detail about how this 
problem plays out in relation to each of the four accepted ‘criteria’ for statehood.  
 
A. POPULATION 
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 As suggested above, one of the critical ideas accompanying the development of the 
idea of the state was that the populace should not be understood merely as the 
accidental objects of a sovereign’s authority, but that they also partook of that 
sovereignty. Increasingly, indeed, as the nation-state emerged, in the late-18th and 
19th centuries, as the dominant rubric for organising collective and inter-communal 
life, ‘the people’ came to be regarded as the immediate object of an emergent art of 
government, for which Lincoln’s phrase ‘government by the people, for the people, 
and of the people’ was an obvious cumulative expression.  A state’s population, by the 
start of the 19th century, was not merely a source of wealth and power for the 
sovereign; nor was it only a means by which the state could ultimately secure itself in 
competition with other states (through the drafting of troops and the cooption of 
labour for the production of wealth, for example).  In addition, and perhaps even 
more importantly, the people provided the rationale for government itself: the 
purpose of government (and hence of the state as a whole) was, above all, the 
promotion of the prosperity and happiness of the populace. 
 
That the state gradually came to have this immanent end encouraged the idea that, to 
be politically and economically viable, it needed to be of sufficient size (Hobsbawm, 
pp. 29-39). The smaller, more ‘backward’, nationalities, as Mill was to aver, were 
much better off being absorbed into larger nations, rather than ‘sulk on [their] own 
rocks…  cut off from the general movement of the World’ (Mill, Considerations on 
Representative Government, 1861, pp 363-4).  Unification became, thus, the 
dominant theme of nation-building in the 19th Century, so much so that the claims of 
those such as the Fenians in Ireland or the Bretons in France were routinely 
disparaged.  This was an idea that had not entirely been shaken off by the early part 
of the 20th Century, as doubt continued to be expressed as to whether small states 
such as Luxembourg or Liechtenstein, for example, could properly be regarded as 
independent states.  Liechtenstein, indeed, was denied membership of the League of 
Nations in 1920, on the formal grounds of its lack of independence from Austria (to 
whom it had ‘delegated’ certain customs and postal duties under Agreement).  
Underlying that rationale, however, was an evident concern over its size and the 
political implications of allowing micro-states the same voting rights as other, bigger 
states in the organs of the League (Duursma, 1996, pp 173-4).  Later practice in the 
context of the United Nations, however, has suggested that this concern is no longer 
quite what it used to be.  In contrast to the League of Nations, statehood is a 
prerequisite for membership of the United Nations. Yet states such as Andorra, 
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Monaco, Brunei, Kiribati, Nauru, Palau, Vanuatu and the Marshall Islands sit 
alongside Liechtenstein in today’s General Assembly, all of them with populations of 
under 1 million.  This has led most scholars of statehood to conclude that, when it 
comes to the criterion of population, there is no minimum threshold. 
 
The alternative then, to a threshold ‘population’ is the idea that the people in 
question must enjoy exclusive relations of nationality with the nascent state.   This 
was an idea, during the early years of the 20th Century, that informed the concerted 
attempt to use the concept of nationality (under banner of ‘national self-
determination’) to demarcate the populations of different states by re-drawing 
boundaries, instituting plebiscites, and engaging in compulsory population 
exchanges (Berman, 2012).  But as much as this practice pointed to the desire, on the 
part of the policy-makers at the time, to ensure that the ‘nation’ and the ‘state’ be 
made congruent, it was also made clear that the competence to confer and withhold 
nationality was a matter falling essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of states. 
That is to say, international law neither required the conferral of nationality in any 
particular case nor prohibited its withdrawal.24  Aside from occasional attempts to 
deal with the problem of statelessness, the only context in which international law 
has involved itself in issue of nationality is in relation to the question of diplomatic 
protection, and specifically in the context in which one state has sought to rely upon a 
contested bond of nationality when bringing a claim against another state.25  To the 
extent, then, that the conferral of nationality has tended to be regarded as a sovereign 
right, it would seem to be a consequence, rather than a precondition, of statehood. 
Moreover, as the toleration of multiple nationality has increased (see Franck, 1999, 
pp 61-75) even the theoretical possibility that the bond of nationality might be 
regarded as a legally effective determinant of the criterion of ‘population’ has almost 
entirely disappeared.   
 
In fact the almost total conceptual separation between statehood and the idea of a 
constitutive population was marked in the second opinion of the Badinter 
Commission in 1992 in which the Commission suggested, in the context of the 
collapse of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, that one of the possible 
implications of the principle of self-determination was that the individuals concerned 
                                                 
24 Nationality Decrees in Tunis and Morocco, Advisory opinion, 1923, PCIJ, Series B, No. 4, 
p. 24 
25 Nottebohm, Second Phase, Judgment, ICJ Rep. 1955, p. 4. 
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should have a right to choose their own nationality.26  That this offered the possibility 
that a majority of the population of a new state might ‘opt’ for the nationality of a 
neighbouring state was treated as largely irrelevant for purposes of determining 
whether the new state met the conditions necessary for its own legal existence.  
Rather than being a condition of statehood, thus, the existence of a ‘population’ 
seems to be cast in almost metaphorical terms – the population must exist ‘as if’ in 
relationship to an order of government over territory, in which their presence as 
objects of coercion is necessary, but their identity as participants in that political 
community remains indeterminate. 
 
B. TERRITORY 
Much of what has been argued above also applies in relation to the criterion of 
territory.  Just as there appears to be no threshold requirement for purposes of 
population, so also it is hard to discern any specific condition concerning possession, 
on the part of the nascent state, of sufficient portions of land.  Monaco has a territory 
of less than 1.95 km2 and the Vatican City (a ‘non-member state’ at the UN) less than 
0.5 km2  (Duursma, 1996, 117).  At the same time, it is clear that the real issue in 
most cases is not size, nor indeed the mere factual possession or control over territory 
(possession may always be ‘adverse’, of course, as in cases of belligerent occupation), 
but rather the ability to rightfully claim the territory as a domain of exclusive 
authority.  If, as Arbitrator Huber put it in the Island of Palmas case, sovereignty 
signifies independence, and independence ‘in regard to a portion of the globe… the 
right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other State, the function of a State’,27 
then the existence or absence of competing claims to sovereignty would appear to be 
key.   
 
However, if what is required of new states is the possession of territory that is 
otherwise ‘unclaimed’ or ‘undisputed’ then, unless one were to be able to identify the 
territory in question as terra nullius (unoccupied territory),28 or territory which has 
been explicitly or tacitly ‘ceded’ to it, then it is very difficult to see how any such 
nascent state could fulfil such a criterion.  Prior to the mid-19th century, it was 
routinely assumed by international lawyers that a ‘distant’ lands ‘inhabited only by 
natives’, as Judge Huber put it in the Island of Palmas Arbitration of 1928, were, in 
                                                 
26 See also, Articles 1 and 11, ILC Draft Articles on Nationality of Natural Persons in Relation 
to the Succession of States (1999). 
27 Island of Palmas Case (1928) 2 RIAA 829 
28 For a discussion of this notion in the context of Western Sahara, see Western Sahara, 
Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1975, p. 12, paras. 79-81. 
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effect, unoccupied – or, at least, occupied by a community which did not count as a 
‘population’. Terra nullius was, thus, the legal doctrine which legitimised the 
conquest of vast swathes of territory, including the whole of Australia, none of which 
was ceded. Today, however, that doctrine has been wholly discredited (Moreton-
Robinson, 2015) - giving rise in the Australian context, for example, to an entire new 
right of ‘native title’.29 With the important exception of Indigenous conceptions of 
‘self-determination’ (see below), the effect of this has been to ensure that claims to 
statehood in the post-decolonisation era are almost routinely oppositional, and 
rendered in the language of secession. 
  
Even if we were to accept the idea that territory is somehow foundational to the 
question of statehood, the position requires further nuance.  It has long been 
accepted, for example, that the absence of clearly delimited boundaries is not a 
prerequisite for statehood.  Albania, for example, was admitted to the League of 
Nations in 1920 despite the fact that its frontiers had yet to be finally fixed, the 
subsequent delimitation of which came to be the subject of an Advisory Opinion of 
the PCIJ in the Monastery of Saint Naoum case of 1924.30  Reflecting on this 
practice, the International Court of Justice subsequently affirmed in the North Sea 
Continental Shelf cases that: 
‘The appurtenance of a given area, considered as an entity, in no 
way governs the precise delimitation of its boundaries, any more 
than uncertainty as to boundaries can affect territorial rights. There 
is for instance no rule that the land frontiers of a State must be fully 
delimited and defined, and often in various places and for long 
periods they are not…’31 
What this appears to suggest is that the border and the territory of the state are 
effectively two different things (notwithstanding the ‘Montevideo’ stipulation that a 
state’s territory must be ‘defined’).  Borders, on one side, seem to be the consequence, 
rather than the cause, of an acknowledgment that the possession of territory by some 
entity is legitimate. Their delimitation, after all, proceeds on the assumption that 
there are legitimate entitlements on either side.  Territory, by contrast, seems to be a 
pre-condition for the assertion of rights of property in relation to territory insofar as 
it concerns the very existence of the legal subject. 
 
                                                 
29 See Mabo and Ors v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1, esp. Judgement of Justice 
Brennan; Native Title Act No. 100 (1993).  
30 Monastery of Saint-Naoum, Advisory Opinion, 1924 PCIJ, Series B, No 9. 
31 North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1969, p. 3, para. 46. 
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This distinction between the territory of a state and its boundaries is an undoubtedly 
appealing one. It opens up the possibility, in particular, of addressing ongoing 
disputes over the location of borders (often determined by reference to the classical 
‘modes’ by which territory might be acquired such as discovery, cession, annexation, 
occupation or prescription32) without, in the process, continually calling into question 
the identity of the states whose borders are the subject of dispute.  It would be almost 
absurd to argue, for example, that the alteration of the UK’s jurisdiction that occurred 
as a consequence of its assertion of sovereignty over the Island of Rockall in 1972 
(following an earlier claim to its ‘possession’ in 1955) was such as to affect its legal 
identity and therefore require it to apply afresh for membership in the UN.   
 
At the same time, however, it is clear that radical changes to borders can sometimes 
have precisely that effect. In 1992, for example, Serbia-Montenegro was denied the 
right to style itself, in the form of the ‘Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’, as the 
continuation of the collapsed Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (in the same 
way that Russia represented itself as the continuation of the former USSR). The 
international community refused to accept its claim that Croatia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Macedonia and Slovenia had ‘seceded’ from Yugoslavia, leaving Serbia-
Montenegro as its remaining ‘rump’ state. On the contrary, the Badinter Commission 
in 1991 characterised the situation as one of Yugoslavia’s ‘dissolution’ rather than 
secession, and in consequence, Serbia-Montenegro was forced, like the other former 
Yugoslav states, to reapply for UN membership as a different state (see Blum, 1992).    
 
Borders, as this suggests, are not merely lines on the ground, or ways of delimiting 
spheres of public jurisdiction. Instead, they serve to delimit both the identity and 
existence of a political order by means of its separation from others – the ‘non-
democratic condition of democracy’ as Balibar puts it.33  The supposition, thus, that 
the existence of borders and the existence of territory are radically different things is 
hard to sustain. In case of the emergence of Israel in 1948, for example, it was not 
merely the case that some of its borders were in question at the time of its recognition 
and admission to the United Nations, but all of them given that it had been carved 
out of the defunct Mandate for Palestine.  What was undoubtedly of significance here 
is the general atmosphere of uncertainty that had been generated, amongst other 
things, by the Security Council’s failure to endorse the General Assembly’s earlier 
                                                 
32 For a classical account of the modes of acquisition of territory see Jennings (1963) 
33 Balibar E., We the People of Europe: Reflections on Transnational Citizenship (2004) p.  
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plan for Palestine’s partition, outlined in Resolution 181(II) of 1947, and the apparent 
termination of the Mandate occasioned by the unilateral withdrawal of the British 
administration.  Since the status of Palestine, as a former mandated territory 
awaiting recognition, was itself in flux at that time, there appeared to be no ‘effective’ 
interlocutor able to claim that recognition of the new state of Israel constituted a 
violation of its own territorial sovereignty (even though there were clearly arguments 
to be made on the part of the Palestinian population generally). The result was such 
as to allow a space for recognition of the state of Israel to open up without, it seems, 
the kinds of qualms associated with premature recognition that would naturally have 
arisen in other contexts. This move was not, of course, universally welcomed. Far 
from recognising Israel as a state, the Arab states launched a war against it, the result 
of which was Israel’s occupation of a still-larger area of mandatory Palestine. Israel’s 
application for UN membership was accepted nonetheless on 11 May 1949, although 
even these newly-enlarged borders had yet to be fully confirmed. What this example 
seems to suggest is that the criterion of territory like that of population, operates less 
as an empirical observation as to the existence of an accepted factual condition, than 
again as a metaphorical assertion: the state must exist ‘as if’ it possessed territory 
with determinate boundaries.  If that is so, then it might also be the case that it is in 
the theatrical performance of statehood – through, amongst other things, the rituals 
of recognition, admission, flying the flag, building walls and policing borders – that 
states come to acquire the territory that supposedly conditions their existence 
(Brown, 2014). 
 
C. INDEPENDENT GOVERNMENT 
For all of the aporias associated with the requirements of territory and population, 
those addressing the criteria for statehood are unified on one matter above all else: 
that the criteria for statehood are ultimately directed towards the recognition of 
‘effective’ governmental entities.34 Effectiveness in this context is generally taken to 
mean that the government of a putative state must demonstrate unrivalled 
possession and control of public power (whatever the specificities of that might be in 
any particular setting) throughout the territory concerned. Once that unrivalled 
possession is established, recognition of statehood may follow.  This emphasis upon 
governmental effectiveness forms a key part of Crawford’s thesis. Given that 
                                                 
34 Lauterpacht, 1947, pp 340-1: ‘The principal and probably the only essential condition of 
recognition of States and governments is effectiveness of power within the State and of actual 
independence of other States.  Other conditions are irrelevant to the true purposes and nature 
of recognition.’ 
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‘nationality is dependent upon statehood, not vice versa’ and that territory is defined 
‘by reference to the extent of governmental power exercised’, ‘there is a good case’, he 
suggests, ‘for regarding government as the most important single criterion of 
statehood, since all the others depend upon it’ (Crawford, 2006, p. 56).   
 
Crawford’s argument doesn’t stop here though.  His purpose is not simply to point 
out that, as the Commission of Jurists maintained in the Aaland Islands case, a new 
state only comes into existence once it is ‘strong enough to assert [itself] throughout 
the territories of the state without the assistance of foreign troops.’35  Rather, it is to 
suggest that this criterion of effectiveness operates as a legal principle in its own 
right, the effect of which is conditioned by other relevant principles of international 
law, and in particular by norms having the status of jus cogens such as the right of 
peoples to self-determination and the prohibition on the use of force.  This leads 
Crawford to a hypothesis which cuts in two directions. On the one hand, he maintains 
that the reason why certain relatively effective political entities, such as the Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus or Southern Rhodesia, were not recognized as 
independent states was that to have offered such recognition would have violated 
certain jus cogens norms. On the other hand, he also argues that where jus cogens 
norms like self-determination do apply, they are able to displace the criterion of 
effectiveness, allowing certain ‘ineffective’ states to be recognised nonetheless.  
 
In this latter context, Crawford cites, by way of illustration, the case of the Belgian 
Congo which was granted a hurried independence in 1960 as the Republic of the 
Congo in circumstances in which little preparation had been made for independence 
and in which public order broke down shortly after (with secessionist factions seeking 
their own independence in Katanga and elsewhere).  Belgian troops were 
reintroduced into the territory under the guise of humanitarian intervention and the 
United Nations responded by establishing ONUC (the United Nations Operation in 
the Congo) for purposes of restoring order whose mission continued until 1964.  As 
Crawford puts it ‘[a]nything less like effective government it would be hard to 
imagine.  Yet despite this there can be little doubt that in 1960 the Congo was a state 
in the full sense of the term’ (Crawford, 2006, p. 57).  Its admission to the United 
Nations for membership had already been approved and UN action had been taken 
on the basis of preserving the ‘sovereign rights of the Republic of the Congo’. 
Crawford suggests ultimately that there were three possible ways of interpreting this 
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practice: (i) that the international recognition of the Congo was simply premature 
because it did not possess an effective government; (ii) that international recognition 
of the Congo had the effect of creating a state despite the fact that it was not properly 
qualified (ie. that recognition was thereby ‘constitutive’); or (iii) that the requirement 
of ‘government’ was, in certain particular contexts, less stringent than might 
otherwise be thought. 
 
Crawford’s clear preference is for the third of these three options and he explains the 
position as follows: 
‘by withdrawing its own administration and conferring 
independence on local authorities, Belgium was precluded from 
denying the consequences of its own conduct.  Thereafter there was 
no international person as against whom recognition of the Congo 
could be unlawful.  It is to be presumed that a new State granted full 
and formal independence by a former sovereign has the 
international right to govern its territory….  On the other hand, in 
the secessionary situation the position is different.  A seceding 
entity seeks statehood by way of an adverse claim, and in general 
statehood can only be obtained by effective and stable exercise of 
governmental powers.’ (Crawford, 2006, pp. 57-8) 
 
It is important to understand the role assigned to the idea of effectiveness here.  To 
begin with, it is presented as a general principle of international law – it is not, in that 
sense, a ‘law creating fact’ (as might be expressed in the phrase ex factis ius oritur), 
but simply a circumstantial trigger that produces certain legal consequences.  
Effectiveness, furthermore, is not sufficient on its own: just as some effective entities 
have not been recognized as states (such as Taiwan whose recognition as an 
independent state has been almost permanently deferred as a consequence of the 
claims made by China over its territory), so also other less-than-effective entities have 
continued to be regarded as states despite that condition (and one may mention here 
both states under a condition of belligerent occupation such as the Baltic Republics 
between 1940 and 1990 and Kuwait in 1990-91, and states which, like Lebanon and 
Burma in the 1970s, have experienced extended periods of internal turmoil).  
Effectiveness, in other words, is supposed to operate as a principle the parameters of 
which are legally determined and may, at that level, interact with other relevant 
principles. 
 
Yet it is equally clear that the further one goes in seeking to juridify the condition of 
‘effective government’, the more clearly one exposes the inevitable tension between a 
legal principle that seeks to allow for the recognition of new aspirant entities once 
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they have become legal ‘facts’, so to speak, and one that prohibits any such 
recognition as a violation of the territorial sovereignty of the state from which that 
entity is to emerge.   In the 19th Century, the criterion of effectiveness was intimately 
linked with the idea of premature recognition.  If a third state were to recognize an 
insurgent movement as an independent state before the moment at which they had 
fully established themselves, that recognition would constitute ‘a wrong done to the 
parent state’ and, indeed, ‘an act of intervention’ (Hall, 1895, p. 89).36  European 
powers were, thus, very cautious when addressing the recognition of the new states in 
South America, for example, frequently modulating their response by reference to 
what seemed to be happening on the ground.  Usually the insurgent communities 
were initially recognized de facto, with de iure recognition coming only once it was 
clear that Spain had given up the fight.  The importance of effectiveness, in such a 
context, was found in the way in which it served to mark the moment at which the 
rights of the parent state gave way in the face of those of the secessionist movement.  
But an examination of the practice indicates that effectiveness never really meant 
quite the same thing in every place.37  What was required in order to establish 
territorial sovereignty depended upon the nature and strength of rival claims. Thus, a 
relatively ineffective Congo Free State, for example, could garner recognition in 1885 
simply because of the apparent absence of any other recognized sovereign whose 
rights would be impeded in the process (the local communities having, it was 
claimed, ‘conceded’ their sovereignty to King Leopold by way of treaties of 
protection). Considerably more was required for the recognition of the new Republics 
in Latin America when it was the sovereignty of another European power (Spain) 
being displaced.  For all the subtle modulations of this early practice, however, such 
arguments clearly became more problematic in the course of the 20th Century once it 
came to be accepted that the use of force was no longer a legitimate means of 
acquiring title to territory.38 
 
                                                 
36 In practice, even the intermediary step of recognizing insurgents as belligerents, as Britain 
and France did in relation to the secessionist states in the American Civil War of 1861-5, was 
frequently treated as an unjustified intervention.   
37 Island of Palmas Case, (1928) 2 RIAA 829 per Huber: ‘Manifestations of territorial 
sovereignty assume… different forms according to conditions of time and place.  Although 
continuous in principle, sovereignty cannot be exercised in fact at every moment on every 
point of a territory.  The intermittence and discontinuity compatible with the maintenance of 
the right necessarily differ according as inhabited or uninhabited regions are involved, or 
regions enclosed within territories in which sovereignty is incontestably displayed or again 
regions accessible from, for instance, the high seas.’ 
38 See article 2(4) UN Charter; Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the UN, 
GA Resn. 2625(XXV), (24 October 1970), Principle 1.  See generally Korman 1996. 
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Given that the general prohibition on the use of force seems to prohibit also the 
annexation of territory, it is very hard to see how one might legitimate the 
establishment of a state on the territory of another by that means (ex inuria ius non 
oritur). Even though the unilateral use of force was still, under the League of Nations, 
merely restricted rather than prohibited outright (as it has been since 1945), the case 
of Manchukuo offers a useful illustration.  When Japan invaded the Chinese territory 
of Manchuria in 1931 and declared a new, supposedly independent state of 
‘Manchukuo’ in its place, the Lytton Commission was dispatched there by the League 
of Nations on a fact-finding mission. The Commission concluded that the Japanese 
action was inconsistent with both the League’s Covenant and the Kellogg-Briand Pact 
(Japan and China being signatories to both) and that Manchukuo itself, far from 
being independent, remained largely under Japanese control.  This report 
underpinned the subsequent articulation of the ‘Stimson doctrine’, the substance of 
which affirmed the refusal of the United States (and those states which followed it) to 
‘admit the legality of any situation de facto… which may impair… the sovereignty, the 
independence, or of the territorial and administrative integrity of the Republic of 
China’ when that situation had been brought about by means contrary to the Pact of 
Paris.39  Several League of Nations resolutions were adopted on this basis calling for 
the non-recognition of ‘Manchuko’ and the ‘state’ was finally dismantled in 1945, 
following Japan’s defeat in the Second World War.  Likewise, the Turkish Republic in 
Northern Cyprus, established as a purportedly independent state following the 
Turkish intervention in 1974, has consistently been denied recognition, principally, 
once again, on the basis that its creation was the product of an unlawful military 
intervention.40  Similar arguments were also put forward by Bosnia in its memorial in 
the Genocide Case which maintained that the Republica Srpska was not a state in 
part at least because its creation was associated with a violation of the prohibition on 
the use of force on the part of Serbian forces. 41  
 
It is worth noting, in this context, that the prohibition on the use of force has been 
instrumental not merely in resisting the establishment of ‘puppet’ regimes, but also 
in preserving the formal ‘continuity’ of states during periods of occupation.  The 
Baltic Republics (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), for example, were occupied by the 
Soviet Union in 1940 and incorporated into the Union.  A good many states refused 
                                                 
39 1 Hackworth 334 
40 See Cyprus v Turkey [GC] no 2571/94, ECHR 2001-IV, 120 ILR 10. 
41 Memorial of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 15th April 1994, p. 
264. 
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to recognise the legality of the incorporation (Ziemele, pp. 22-27) and when in 1990 
the Supreme Councils of the three Baltic states resolved to ‘re-establish’ their 
independence (which involved the re-invocation of laws pre-dating the occupation 
and the rejection of obligations assumed on their behalf by the Soviet Union) the EC 
adopted a Declaration welcoming ‘the restoration of sovereignty and independence of 
the Baltic states which they had lost in 1940’ and resolving to re-establish diplomatic 
relations with them.42  The prohibition on the use of force, in other words, seems to 
work not only as a way of denying the recognition to what might otherwise be 
regarded as effective entities, but also as a way of keeping alive (as a formal idea at 
least) states which have been the subject of occupation and annexation and which 
are, to all intents and purposes, therefore ‘ineffective’. One may recall, to cite another 
pertinent example, that the first Gulf War of 1990 was authorized by the Security 
Council in Resolution 678 (29 November 1990) on the basis of seeking to protect and 
secure the territorial integrity and political independence of Kuwait. The presumptive 
illegality of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait made it possible to presuppose the latter’s 
continued existence as a Sate and in this way to authorise intervention on the basis of 
collective self-defence, despite the fact that Kuwait’s government had been effectively 
displaced by that of Iraq. 
 
The question remains, however, as to what will become of the principle of 
governmental effectiveness if it really is, as Crawford suggests, being systematically 
displaced by the emergence of jus cogens norms – in the post-1945 period in 
particular. On one side, one may note an increased willingness to recognize as states 
(for one reason or another) entities that are in some respects ineffective. One may 
recall in recent years, for example, that both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia were 
recognized by the EC as independent states in 1992 at a time at which the 
governments concerned had effective control over only a portion of the territory in 
question (Rich 1993).    On the other side, however, it is hard to think of many 
examples of new states emerging and being recognized simply because they have 
managed to secure their independence ‘effectively’ – that is, as a matter of fact. Over 
the past decade alone, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Azawad, South Sudan, Donetsk and 
several other entities - not to mention ‘Islamic State’, and of course ‘North Sudan’  – 
have all declared their independence under governments (or at least under leaders) 
which arguably did possess ‘effective’ control over a particular territory, and yet none 
of these entities has been recognised as states by more than a few member of the 
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international community. At the time of writing, it seems imminent that Catalonia 
and Iraqi Kurdistan are about to do the same. Even when it does seem possible that a 
new state has emerged – in the disputed case of Kosovo, for example, which declared 
its independence in 2008 – the principle of effectiveness is not usually employed as 
the definitive explanation. Other frameworks, such as consent, self-determination or 
disintegration, are usually deployed in its place as a means of displacing the claims of 
the territorial sovereign.  Arguably the most problematic cases were those of 
Bangladesh and Eritrea, the recognition of which could not easily be framed in terms 
of the standard understanding of self-determination.  Yet even here, commentators 
have tended to seek some other interpretive framework for explaining such practice: 
relying, for example, on the idea that Eritrea had been unlawfully seized by Ethiopia, 
and that Bangladesh had been effectively governed as a non-self-governing territory 
by Pakistan (a case ‘approximating’ colonial rule) and could therefore claim a right of 
self-determination. 
 
This tendency towards the promotion of an exclusively ‘juridical’ idea of statehood in 
which questions of effectiveness are routinely subordinated by reference to other 
legal principles has been noted in the work of Jackson and Kreijen, among others.  
For Jackson (1990, pp 21-31), decolonisation marked the moment at which the 
notion of sovereignty increasingly took on a negative cast (as implying merely 
freedom from external interference as opposed to a positive capacity to act), leading 
to the recognition of what he calls ‘quasi-states’. These are states which, because of 
their precipitous independence, were given the imprimatur of statehood before they 
had developed the necessary internal capacity for political self-government and 
economic independence – that is, before they had become effective. A similar stance 
is adopted by Kreijen who speaks of this change in terms of the ‘transformation of the 
notion of independence from an inherently material concept based on internal 
sovereignty to a mere formal legal condition primarily depending on external 
recognition’ (Kreijen, 2002, p 92).  For Kreijen, this ‘juridification of statehood’ was a 
situation that demanded ameliorative action on the part of the international 
community, through the recognition of a right to development, or the reintroduction 
of the notion of trusteeship into international law. 
 
Such reflections draw, obviously enough, upon themes embedded within the old 19th 
Century ‘standard of civilization, and those same themes have been given further 
impetus in more recent debates over so-called ‘failed’ or ‘fragile’ states. The origin of 
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this debate can be traced by to an influential article by Helman and Ratner (1992), in 
which they were to identify, as a new phenomenon in international relations, a class 
of ‘failed’ or ‘failing states’.  Failed states, for their purposes, were states such as those 
like Somalia, Sudan, Liberia and Cambodia, in which (in their terms again) civil 
conflict, government breakdown and economic privation imperilled their own 
citizens and threatened their neighbours ‘through refugee flows, political instability, 
and random warfare’.  The designation of such states as ‘failed’, of course, was not 
simply a neutral exercise in description or diagnosis, but formed a necessary prelude 
for the adumbration of a series of intrusive policy recommendations the central 
feature of which was the proposed introduction of a system of ‘United Nations 
Conservatorship’ along the lines subsequently established in East Timor, Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Kosovo for purposes of national, post-conflict, reconstruction.   
 
Whilst for Helman and Ratner, the idea of state ‘failure’ was one that recommended 
reconstructive activity, in other hands, it has formed the basis for advocacy of a 
‘preventive’ system including the imposition of sanctions upon such states and their 
exclusion from membership in international organizations (Rotberg, 2002).  In some 
cases, indeed, the notion has even been employed as the basis for a refusal to 
recognize or implement treaty obligations.43  As Simpson points out, such ideas are 
redolent of those abounding at the end of the 19th Century in which critical 
differentiations were made between different kinds of state and other polities 
(deemed ‘civilized’, ‘semi-civilized’ or ‘barbarous’) for the purpose of legitimating a 
range of different kinds of intervention (Simpson, 2004, pp. 240-242).  On such a 
view the re-emergence of this ‘liberal anti-pluralist’ theme within international legal 
doctrine (in which the principles of territorial sovereignty and sovereign equality are 
routinely downplayed or excised) recalls the intellectual structures of 19th Century 
imperialism (Gordon 1997).  Yet it is also run through with many of the same kinds of 
contradictions.  Just as 19th Century international lawyers struggled with the problem 
of having to simultaneously recognise and deny the status of political communities in 
the extra-European world, so those invoking the notion of state ‘failure’ seem to 
maintain in place the idea that they are indeed still states for purposes of attributing 
responsibility for their condition, yet not entitled to the normal prerogatives of 
sovereignty that the intervening states would expect for themselves.  As Crawford 
                                                 
43 See Yoo, Memorandum, 9 January 2002 explaining that the Geneva Conventions did not 
apply because Afghanistan was a failed state. 
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succinctly concludes, ‘[t]o talk of States as “failed” sounds suspiciously like blaming 
the victims’ (Crawford, 2006, p. 722).  
 
One way to make sense of this discourse of failure, however, is to notice how it subtly 
shifts attention away from standard questions as to the ‘intensity’ and ‘exclusivity’ of 
governmental effectiveness towards its implicit content. According to Crawford, 
‘international law lays down no specific requirements as to the nature and extent of 
[governmental] control, except that it include some degree of maintenance of law and 
order and the establishment of basic institutions’ (Crawford, 2006, p 56). Yet this 
definition clearly offers little assistance in the task of distinguishing a government 
from some other kind of social arrangement – whatever ‘government’ is not. One 
might ask, in that respect, what type of control counts as ‘law and order’, and what 
administrative arrangements meet the benchmark of ‘basic institutions’? One does 
not have to dig too deeply, in fact, to find an answer. In a wealth of cases, from the 
‘unequal treaties’ concluded with the Chinese Empire in the late-19th century, to the 
‘minorities treaties’ concluded with the ‘national states’ of Central and Eastern 
Europe after the First World War, to much more recent efforts at ‘state-building’ in 
the Balkans and elsewhere, states have only been recognised as such if, and to the 
extent that, they have put in place an administrative regime that is capable of 
protecting a narrow set of individual rights – to personal security, to equal treatment 
and the protection of property (Parfitt, 2016). The implicit telos of ‘government’, in 
such cases, has been the establishment of such minimal conditions as might be 
required to enable global commerce to progressively extend its reach alongside, and 
within, the armature of the state. 
 
What was evidently missing from this, was any sense that governments might be 
assessed on their willingness and capacity to minimise hunger or poverty, 
redistribute wealth, offer universal free education or protect the environment. Even 
the recent trend towards conditioning recognition upon the implementation of 
provisions concerning human rights - as in Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina, for 
example – manifests the same orientation. For example, the ill-fated Comprehensive 
Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement proposed in February 2007 by the then-
UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari, suggested that Kosovo should, as a condition of 
its recognition as an independent state, commit itself to becoming ‘a multi-ethnic 
society’, governing itself ‘democratically and with full respect for the rule of law 
through its legislative, executive and judicial institutions’.  In addition, furthermore, 
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to protecting ‘the highest level of human rights’, it was also expected to create ‘an 
open market with free competition’, compliance with which would be subject to the 
ongoing ‘supervision’ by the ‘international community’.44 ‘Effective government’, 
here, retains the same valence ‘effective occupation’ did in the 1885 Berlin Act’s 
stipulations regarding the validity of European claims to sovereignty in the Congo 
Basin – it requires the creation and maintenance of a minimal legal framework 
required for commodity production and exchange.  And it is in that connection that 
the implicit sub-text of the regime of statehood begins to become apparent: to be a 
state is to be capable of participating in the global market, and enabling the 
continued reproduction of conditions that underpin the unequal global distribution 




If, as suggested above, one of the primary objectives of the Pan American Union in 
drafting the Montevideo criteria was to marginalise, or even eliminate, the practice of 
recognition as a way of regulating the admission of non-European states into the 
international legal order, it could not succeed in rendering ‘statehood’ an entirely 
objective category. After all, as critics of the ‘declaratory’ position have argued, 
however confidently a political community might believe itself to have fulfilled the 
criteria for statehood, it is only through acceptance of that fact by other states that 
this belief becomes effective.  To such critics, it is meaningless to assert that 
Somaliland, the ‘Republic of Artsakh’, or indeed ‘Islamic State’ are states if no other 
states are prepared to treat them as such. Those, by contrast, who continue to defend 
the declaratory approach point to the political and discretionary character of 
recognition – to the fact that, as in the Tinoco Arbitration, a state like the UK may 
refuse to recognize another (government in that case) not because of any perceived 
defect in origin or competence, but simply because it does not wishes to have 
diplomatic relations with it.45  The determinants of statehood must, they argue, be 
posited as anterior to the practice of recognition (even if the latter may be thought to 
provide evidence for the former), simply in order to guard against the risk that 
recognition might be deployed (or withheld) for political purposes. The real difficulty 
arrives, of course, when it comes to entities like Palestine and, more recently, Kosovo, 
which are both recognised and unrecognised by numerous states. Are they states for 
                                                 
44 Ahtisaari Plan, (2007) Art. 1, “General Principles”, paras. 1.1-1.4, 1.11.   
45 Tinoco Arbitration (Costa Rica v Great Britain) (1923) 1 RIAA 369; (1924) 18 A.J.I.L. 147, 
at p 154. 
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the purposes of some members of the international community and not for others, as 
the constitutive position would suggest? Or are they states regardless of their non-
recognition by other members of that community, having met the criteria for 
statehood as judged by some external arbiter, as the declaratory position would 
suggest – without, however, supplying a satisfactory answer as to who, if not states 
themselves, that arbiter must be?  
 
To a large extent these respective positions on the question of recognition turn, not so 
much on the question as to whether the existence of a state is a self-expressive fact, or 
upon the fulfilment or lack thereof of the requisite criteria, but upon the analytical 
relationship between the two elements of ‘status’ and ‘relations’.  In one (the 
declaratory approach) these are kept distinct: the question of status has to be 
determined prior to the creation of relations with others.   Only those entities 
fulfilling the requisite criteria can be said to have the capacity to enter into legal 
relations with others as states.  In the other, the two issues are merged such that the 
existence or otherwise of such relations becomes the mode by which status is 
determined.  Only those entities having relations with other states can be assumed to 
have the legal capacity to do so.  The difficulty with the declaratory position is that it 
seeks to maintain both the idea that the creation of states is rule-governed, and that 
the conferral or withholding of recognition is an essentially political and 
discretionary act.  To postulate the existence of a rule, but then deny it any ground for 
being applied is to rely rather heavily upon the self-executory character of formal 
rule.   The difficulty with the constitutive position, by contrast, is that it seeks to 
maintain that the conferral or withholding of recognition is a legal act (or at least one 
with legal effects) but that in the absence of either a ‘duty to recognize’ (as asserted by 
Lauterpacht, 1947) or of the existence of an agency competent to adjudicate (as 
asserted by Dugard, 1987), then allows the question of status to become entirely 
dependent upon the individual position of the recognizing states.  The best one could 
say from a constitutive position, in any particular context, was that a political 
community was ‘more or less’ a state. 
 
For the most part, although many profess to prefer the ‘declaratory approach’,46 
doctrine on recognition remains fundamentally ambivalent on most of these key 
                                                 
46 Article 3: ‘The political existence of the state is independent of recognition by the other 
states’; and article 6: ‘The recognition of a state merely signifies that the state which 
recognizes it accepts the personality of the other with all the rights and duties determined by 
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questions.47 There are two particular difficulties.  To begin with, it is clear that 
recognition of another state will have certain legal implications: it implies, at the very 
least, a commitment to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state it 
has recognized and will also have a range of domestic legal consequences as might 
concern the recognition of its law and legal transactions occurring within its 
jurisdiction.  By the same token, it is almost universally held that recognition will not 
necessarily imply a willingness to enter into diplomatic relations with that other state 
nor indeed, a recognition of its government (prior to 2001, for example, only three 
states recognized the Taliban as the government of Afghanistan, yet there was no 
doubt that all recognized the state of Afghanistan).   But it is not always easy to 
dissociate the fact of recognition from the idea of political approval.  In the context of 
governmental recognition (relevant primarily in case of those governments 
establishing their authority by unconstitutional means) this issue led to the 
enunciation by the Mexican Secretary of Foreign Relations of what became known as 
the ‘Estrada Doctrine’ the effect of which was to recommend the recognition of all 
effective governments irrespective of the means by which they came to power 
(Jessup, 1931).  However, it was inevitable that there would always be question of 
interpretation in cases in which two (or more) rival governments found themselves 
competing for power. It is perhaps no wonder, then, that the policy of formal 
governmental recognition has gradually be abandoned (for a critique, see Talmon, 
1998 3-14).   
 
The difficulty of separating law from policy/politics, however, has not been confined 
to governmental recognition, but has also influenced practice in relation to the 
recognition of states.  Whilst, as we have seen, non-recognition has often been 
employed as a way of signalling the international community’s condemnation of 
attempts to subvert processes of self-determination or to establish new states by 
recourse to force, the fact that it is also still seen to be an essentially ‘discretionary act 
that other states may perform when they choose and in the manner of their own 
choosing’48 makes it a somewhat haphazard semeiotic device.   In an enlightening 
typology, Warbrick (1997, pp. 10-11) explains that the mere statement ‘We (State A) 
do not recognize entity X as a State’ has at least five possible meanings: 
                                                                                                                                            
international law’.  See also, Badinter Commission, Opinions 8 and 10, 92 ILR 201, 206 
(1992). 
47 See Brownlie, (1982) 197: ‘in the case of “recognition”, theory has not only failed to enhance 
the subject but has created a tertium quid which stands, like a bank of fog on a still day, 
between the observer and the contours of the ground which calls for investigation’.   
48 Badinter Commission, Opinion No. 10 of 1992, 92 ILR 206, p. 208. 
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(1) We take no decision, one way or another, about recognizing X [in A’s eyes, X 
may or may not be a State]; 
(2) We have chosen not to recognize X (although we could do) for political 
reasons not related to X’s status [by implication, A does consider X to be a 
State]; 
(3) We do not recognize X because it would be unlawful/premature for us to do 
so [A does not regard X as legally a State]; 
(4) We do not recognize X, although it might (appear to) be a State, because there 
are customary law obligations or specific treaty obligations which prohibit us 
from doing so; 
(5) We do not recognize X, although it might (appear to) be a State, because there 
is a specific obligation imposed by the Security Council not to do so. 
 
Much would seem to depend, thus, upon how the recognising state characterises or 
understands its own actions.  Only by looking behind the refusal to recognise might 
one determine a difference in stance, for example, between the refusal to recognise 
the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus or, more recently, the ‘breakaway 
Republics’ of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (informed, it seems, by a reflection upon 
the illegality – respectively – of the Turkish intervention in Cyprus and Russian 
intervention in Georgia) and the similar refusal to recognize the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia in early 1992 (informed, it seems, by an unwillingness to 
prejudice diplomatic relations with Greece).  In some cases, however, the position is 
simply opaque.  It was never entirely clear, for example, as to whether those Arab 
states which refused to recognize the state of Israel before 1993 really believed that 
Israel was not a state (and hence was not bound by the various treaty obligations to 
which it was a party), or whether they merely desired to make clear that it should not 
exist as a state, even if it did so in fact. If it is necessary to read recognition policy 
symptomatically – that is, as an expression of a particular standpoint that might, or 
might not, be made explicit – then it becomes increasingly difficult to disentangle 
those considerations that bear upon the question of legal status, and those that 
apparently do not.  
 
Bearing this out, even states taking a firm position in seeking to avoid recognition of a 
state (and hence avoid any sense of condoning its existence) have found themselves, 
in practice, unable or unwilling to live with the consequences. In refusing to recognise 
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Israel, for example, few of the Arab states were willing to accept as a consequence of 
that non-recognition that Israel was not bound by the Geneva Conventions of 1949 in 
relation to its occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, or that it was otherwise free to 
ignore general principles of international law governing the use of force. More 
generally, domestic courts have also frequently sought to avoid the consequences of 
non-recognition policies, and have resorted to a variety of different expedients to 
allow judicial cognition of the laws of what are formally unrecognized states.  In the 
Carl Zeiss Case, for example, the House of Lords avoided the obvious consequences 
of the British government’s refusal to recognise the German Democratic Republic by 
treating the legislative acts of the GDR as essentially those of the USSR.49  Similarly, 
in Hesperides Hotels, Lord Denning adopted a policy, already well established in the 
United states, of allowing recognition of the laws of unrecognized states (in that case 
the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus) insofar as they related to ‘the day to day 
affairs of the people, such as their marriages, their divorces, their leases, their 
occupations and so forth’.50  In the UK, in fact, this latter policy has come to find 
formal expression in the Foreign Corporations Act of 1991 which states that foreign 
corporations having status under the laws of an unrecognised state may nevertheless 
be treated as a legal person if those laws are ‘applied by a settled court system in that 
territory’.  In each of these cases, an important consideration seems to have been a 
concern to insulate the ‘innocent’ population from the ‘illegalities’ associated with the 
claims to authority on the part of their governments. But they also illustrate in some 
ways a continued prevarication between the need, on the one hand, to recognise 
‘effective’ entities whilst, on the other, to ensure at least the semblance of some 
commitment to the legal values that a refusal to recognize might have embodied.  
Just as, in the past, the distinction between recognition de iure and recognition de 
facto allowed states the opportunity to have dealings with insurgent governments 
without, at the same time, being seen to implicate themselves to overtly in an act of 
intervention, so also the more recent practice of recognising the acts of certain 
governments whilst not recognising their claims to statehood underlines the point 
made above, that legal doctrine has consistently sought to embed both law and fact 
within itself – at the price of an apparently chronic normative instability.  
 
To illustrate the point, if doctrine on statehood and recognition seems to admit the 
necessity of a constructive ambiguity, perhaps the most obviously anomalous (or is 
                                                 
49 Carl-Zeiss-Stiftung v Rayner & Keeler Ltd (No 2) [1967] 1 AC 853. See also Gur 
Corporation v Trust bank of Africa [1987] 1 QB 599. 
50 Hesperides Hotels Ltd v. Aegean Turkish Holidays Ltd, [1978] QB 205, p. 218. 
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that representative?) case is that of Taiwan, or the ‘Republic of China’ (ROC), as it is 
known officially (Crawford, 2006, pp. 198-221). In 1949, the Nationalist government 
of what was then the Republic of China, the Kuomintang, fled mainland China during 
the civil war and took up residence on the island of Taiwan. Until 1971, it continued 
to be recognised as the official Chinese government, to the extent of occupying 
China’s permanent seat on the Security Council. In 1971, however, Taiwan was 
removed from the United Nations and its seat was taken up, instead, by the 
Government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which had been in de facto 
control of mainland China since 1949, and gradually from the late 1970s onwards 
states transferred their recognition from the government of the ROC to that of the 
PRC. The government of Taiwan (the ROC) has never entirely renounced its claim to 
being the government of China as a whole, however; and nor has it, for this reason, 
asserted its existence as an independent state unequivocally.  Taiwan, nevertheless, 
has many dealings with other states, largely on the same basis as any other state (but 
without the same diplomatic privileges). Taiwanese government agencies are often 
regarded as having legal status in other countries and a capacity to sue and be sued.  
It is a party to a number of treaties and has membership in the WTO (as a ‘Separate 
Customs Territory’ under the name ‘Chinese Taipei’).  In the UK, Taiwanese 
corporations are allowed to do business under the terms of the 1991 Foreign 
Corporations Act ‘as if’ Taiwan were a recognized state, and in the US relations have 
largely been ‘normalised’ under the terms of the Taiwan Relations Act 1979 which 
seeks to implement the policy of maintaining ‘unofficial relations’.  So extreme is the 
mismatch between Taiwan’s formal claims and effective status that ‘[i]t is surprising’ 
as Crawford observes ‘it does not suffer from schizophrenia’. (Crawford, 2006, p. 





As we have already seen, one of the key characteristics of the idea of the state as it 
was to emerge in social and political thought from the time of Grotius onwards was 
that it was never solely reducible to the authority of the ruler or government of the 
time.  The idea of the state was always organised by reference also to a community, 
society or nation in relation to which governmental authority would be exercised.  It 
is no accident, thus, that ‘international law’ acquired the designation, attributed to it 
by Bentham, rather than ‘inter-state’ law or ‘inter-sovereign’ law, for example. The 
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ius gentium was always seen as the law between nations or societies as much as a law 
between sovereigns, and the term civitas or respublica more often than not merely 
denoted the internal relationship between one thing and the other. Nevertheless, 
there were two immanent traditions of thought which informed this relationship 
between nation and state as they were to develop (Skinner, 2004, pp 368-413). One 
of these was a tradition of civic republicanism that conceived of sovereign authority 
as a product of relations between individuals existing within the frame of a pre-
conceived society (exemplified most clearly in the theory of the social contract). The 
other was a ‘communitarian’ or ‘romantic’ tradition that emphasised the corporate 
character of the society or nation, the institutional expression of which would be the 
state (exemplified in Pufendorf’s characterisation of the state as a ‘moral person’).  In 
both cases, the ‘nation’ remained an important idea – on one side as the social frame 
that would emerge out of the contract of sovereignty; on the other side as a natural 
community endowed with certain innate ends and prerogatives (and, indeed, perhaps 
an independent ‘will’). In neither case, however, was the nation entirely reducible to 
the state itself. 
 
As noted above, over the course of the 19th Century, and in particular in the 
immediate aftermath of the First World War, these two themes came to be 
summarised in a single verbal expression, that of ‘national self-determination’. Far 
from resolving the tension between them, however, the various iterations of this idea 
merely internalised and reproduced the two traditions. Those who associated 
themselves with the tradition of civic republicanism (with its roots in the 
enlightenment and the work of those such as Kant), conceived of self-determination 
primarily in terms of representative self-government: it being the promotion of 
individual liberty through the technique of self-rule that was sought.  Here, the 
nation was not so much a condition or pre-supposition, but something that was to be 
developed through a practice of self-rule marshalled by the state – it was, the state, as 
Bourdieu put it, that was charged with making the nation rather than the other way 
round. (Bourdieu, pp. 346-52) By contrast, the version of self-determination that 
came to be associated, in the early part of this period, with emergent nationalist 
thought in Latin America, Greece, Germany, Italy and elsewhere (sustained in the 
work of Herder, Fichte, and Mazzini amongst others) insisted that if this principle 
was to be realised, it was the nation that came first, and the state had to be mapped 
around it.  It was, thus, the perfection of national society (whether determined by 
reference to racial, ethnic, religious, linguistic or historic homogeneity) that was to be 
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sought in the promotion of its self-determination. These two concepts of self-
determination presented very different challenges to the existing order of sovereign 
states. The first presented a challenge to the authority of those government which 
sought to represent the will of their populations externally without necessarily being 
willing to make themselves responsible to them internally.  The second offered an 
‘external’ challenge to the spatial ordering of a dynastic European society and its 
failure to map itself congruously with the geography of ‘nations’ as they were to 
perceive themselves. These were not identical challenges by any means: the former 
appeared to confront the sovereign’s authority with a criterion of legitimacy founded 
upon a rationalistic conception of representation, whereas the latter appeared to 
challenge even representative authority with a claim to power based upon group 
identity (Berman, 1987-88, p 58). In either sense, however, national self-
determination was clearly the language of change and reform (see Cobban, 1945), at 
least until the full horror of its potential became clear, in later years, in the doctrines 
of lebensraum, spazzio vitale and Hakkō ichiu.  
 
It was in the reconstruction of Europe in the aftermath of the 1914-18 War, however, 
that the principle of national self-determination was to obtain its most concrete 
institutional expression.  The agenda had been set by President Wilson in his speech 
to Congress in 1918 in which he famously set out the ‘Fourteen Points’ which he 
believed should inform the peace process.  None of these points referred explicitly to 
the principle of national self-determination, but it was nevertheless made clear that 
boundaries in the new Europe should be configured so far as possible by reference to 
‘historically established’ relations of nationality and allegiance.  The Polish state was 
resurrected, Czechoslovakia and a Serb-Croat-Slovene state created out of the former 
Austro-Hungarian Empire and various other border adjustments made with 
provision for plebiscites in various locations.  In many respects, however, it was an 
imperfect plan. On the one hand, it was always evident that the task of aligning 
political boundaries around the various ‘nations’ of Europe would be ‘utterly 
impracticable’, not simply because of the difficulties of determining which ‘nation’ 
deserved a state, but also because of their dispersed character (Hobsbawm, 1992, pp 
131-141).  This recommended two expedients – one being the forcible transfer of 
certain populations (between Greece and Turkey, for example51), the other being the 
institution of minority protection regimes within the various Peace Treaties in order 
                                                 
51 Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations, Lausanne, January 
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to safeguard the position of those residual national communities that found 
themselves suddenly cut adrift from the ‘kin state’ to which they were thought 
naturally to belong (Fink, 2004; Claude, 1955, pp. 12-30).  On the other hand, it was 
also evident that the Wilsonian project of self-determination was destined to be 
geographically limited – national self-determination was not something that was 
envisaged as being applicable in relation to the victorious powers themselves (e.g. for 
the Flemish, the Irish or Basques) or, indeed, to any of their colonies. 
Notwithstanding the promises made to Arab nationalists during the War, and the 
many non-European nations which sought recognition of their territorial claims at 
the Paris Peace Conference – from Ho Chi Minh on behalf of Vietnam, then part of 
French Indochina, to Şerif Pasha, representing the Society for the Ascension of 
Kurdistan – the closest thing to ‘national self-determination’ implemented outside 
Europe was the institution of the Mandate System.   
 
If national self-determination was merely the implicit and rather contradictory 
premise behind the reorganisation of Europe after the First World War, it became a 
very much more explicit part of the settlement after the Second World War, though 
on quite different terms.  The UN Charter identified respect for the principle of equal 
rights and self-determination of peoples as being one of the purposes of the 
Organization (Article 1). Meanwhile, Chapter XI of the Charter underlined the duty of 
administering states to foster self-government, development and the political, 
economic, social and educational ‘advancement’ of those peoples which had ‘not yet 
attained a full measure of self-government’.  In effect, while Chapter XII transformed 
the League’s ‘mandated territories’ (and some others) into ‘trust territories’ under its 
‘administration and supervision’, Chapter XI undertook (even to the extent of 
reproducing the language of the ‘sacred trust’) to transform all remaining colonies 
into the equivalent of ‘Class A’ mandated territories, whose ‘free political institutions’ 
metropolitan powers were duty-bound to ‘develop’ on a ‘progressive’ basis (article 
73). The populations of such ‘non-self-governing territories’ had other ideas, 
however, and by 1960 decolonisation was well under way. As was made clear by the 
newly-enlarged General Assembly in a series of Resolutions beginning with the 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Territories of 1960, ‘self-
determination’ was a right belonging to all colonies, entailing an obligation to take 
‘immediate steps…in Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories or all other territories 
which have not yet attained independence, to transfer all powers to the peoples of 
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those territories, without any conditions or reservations’.52  Over the course of the 
next 30 years most of those territories identified as ‘non-self-governing’ by the 
United Nations were to acquire their independence and become, as an important 
marker of their new status, members of the United Nations. 
 
Whilst decolonisation was obviously to transform the membership of the UN, and 
radically re-shape the character and nature of its activities, the scope of the right of 
peoples to self-determination which emerged, remained unclear for some time.  In 
one direction, the question as to whether self-determination was a principle 
applicable only the context of decolonisation, or whether it might also legitimate 
secession in other contexts, remained unanswered.  Apart from the problematic 
example of Bangladesh, which having seceded from Pakistan received UN 
membership in March 1972, UN practice seemed limited in that sense, but limited in 
a way that seemed to speak of pragmatism rather than principle.  If what was in 
contemplation was the ‘self-determination’ of ‘all peoples’ as article 1(1) of the two 
UN Covenants on Human Rights affirmed in 1966,53 then why did practice seem to 
restrict it only to those overseas territories that had formed part of the maritime 
empires of European states?   Was it only in that context that one could speak of 
peoples being non-self-governing or subject to oppression or alien rule? And where 
(as the Ibo in Biafra and the Katanganese in Congo wondered) had the word 
‘national’ gone?  
 
It soon became apparent in the 1960s that the right to self-determination, understood 
as a right to opt for independent statehood, was not allocated on the basis of ethnic or 
linguistic homogeneity, but rather on the basis of pre-existing – that is, colonial – 
administrative boundaries. In some instances, the external boundaries of the colony 
defined the presumptive unit of self-determination – as, for example, in the case of 
Ghana or the Belgian Congo.  In other cases, the extent of that unit was determined 
by reference to the internal boundaries that demarcated the different administrative 
units of a single colonial power, such as the boundary between Uganda and 
Tanganyika, for example.  The principle, in this second case, came to be expressed in 
the phrase uti possidetis iuris (‘as you possess under law’) and had its origins in the 
somewhat hazy practice of boundary delimitation in Latin America. Following its 
implicit endorsement by the Organisation of African Unity’s Heads of State and 
                                                 
52 GA Resn. 1514 (14th Dec. 1960), para. 5.  See also, GA Resn. 1541 (15th Dec. 1960). 
53 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) Article 1(1); International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), Article 1(1). 
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Government in 1964,54 it subsequently came to be affirmed as ‘a general principle… 
logically connected with the phenomenon of obtaining independence, wherever it 
occurs’ whose ‘obvious purpose is to prevent the independence and stability of new 
States being endangered by fratricidal struggles’55 (see generally Shaw, 1996). While 
it did provide a way of resolving the prior question of who ‘the people’ were, enabling 
them then to decide collectively on the shape of their political future, precisely what 
‘logic’ strictly required obeisance to the inherited parameters of colonial 
administration was not clear (Mutua, 1995). Certainly, however, an awareness of the 
role played by the minorities regime and by nationalism more generally in triggering 
the Second World War and subsequent genocidal practices, played no small part in 
the gradual abandonment of the idea of ‘national’ self-determination in favour of a 
self-determination of ‘peoples’. 
 
In many ways – as divided peoples like the Kurds, Zulu and Tamils, ethnic minorities 
within the new states like the Rohingya, and the Lozi, and Indigenous peoples 
throughout Australia, New Zealand, Canada and elsewhere could hardly fail to notice 
– the implementation of self-determination proved, in practice, to deliver far less 
than it had promised. If, as Berman puts it, the principle of self-determination 
challenged some of the most basic assumptions of legal thought ‘by posing the 
problem of law’s relationship to sources of normative authority lying beyond the 
normal rules of a functioning legal system’ (Berman, 1988-89, p. 56), already by the 
1980s it had already assumed a quiescent form.  The more it came to be identified as 
a prosaic institutional practice, or as a pragmatic obeisance to the determined 
character of existing boundaries, the less dangerous (and indeed less emancipatory) 
it seemed.  As the Supreme Court of Canada subsequently clarified in 1992, the right 
to be a state (or at least to include that option on the list of possible outcomes) was, 
according to extant customary international law, possessed only in ‘exceptional’ 
situations, those being ‘at best’ in ‘situations of former colonies; where a people is 
oppressed, as for example under foreign military occupation; or where a definable 
group is denied meaningful access to government to pursue their political, economic, 
social and cultural development’ – the latter situation remaining, as we shall see, 
extremely contested.56 In all other situations, the right to self-determination was an 
‘internal’ one, amounting to ‘a people's pursuit of its political, economic, social and 
                                                 
54 ‘Cairo Declaration on Boundaries’, Organisation of African Unity Heads of state and 
Government, Cairo, July 1964, AHG/Res.16(1) 1964).  
55 Frontier Dispute, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, 554, para. 20. 
56 Supreme Court of Canada, Reference Re: Secession of Quebec, 2 S.C.R. 217, para. 138.  
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cultural development within the framework of an existing state’ (para. 126). Only 
through this distinction between ‘external’ and ‘internal’ self-determination, coupled 
with an increased emphasis placed upon the intrinsic relationship between ‘internal’ 
self-determination and the protection of individual and collective human rights 
(Cassese, 1995, pp. 101-140; McCorquordale 1994), can it now be construed as a right 
of ‘all peoples’.  
 
Yet if self-determination does, nonetheless, amount to a right to statehood at least in 
the ‘exceptional’ cases of colonialism and military occupation, this leaves open the 
question of how that right can be squared with the rights of existing states, and in 
particular with the right to territorial integrity. For some colonial powers, after all, 
the colony was still largely regarded as an inherent part of the metropolitan state 
(very much more so for Portugal and France, for example, than for Britain) the 
separation of which necessarily implied some diminution of the sovereign claims of 
the colonial powers.  If this made the (‘external’) right of self-determination a difficult 
one to assert, the yet-to-be-determined status of claimant ‘people’ made it still 
harder. By its nature, the right of self-determination seemed to speak of a process of 
determining future status, rather than a status in its own right.  This, as Berman 
notes, posed the question as to how international law could possibly ‘recognize a right 
accruing to an entity which, by its own admission, lack[ed] international legal 
existence?’ (Berman, 1988-89, p 52).  The answer to that question, as it was to 
emerge during decolonisation, seemed to be that self-determination had a suspensive 
capacity the effect of which was to displace claims to sovereignty on the part of the 
parent state, and affirm, somewhat obscurely, the nascent claims to sovereignty on 
the part of the people whose future had yet to be determined.  There was, in fact, a 
model for this idea already in place and which had already informed some of the 
practice of the ICJ in its deliberations on the question of sovereignty in case of 
Protected States (such as Morocco)57 and Mandate territories.  In the case of the 
latter, as McNair was to put it, the question of sovereignty seemed to lie in 
‘abeyance’.58  The rights of the mandatory power, he suggested, were not those of a 
sovereign, but rather those enjoyed in virtue of agreement, to be exercised by way of 
the ‘sacred trust’ spoken of in Article 22 of the Covenant.  Independence thus in no 
way implied a loss of sovereignty, or a violation of the principle of territorial integrity, 
                                                 
57 Case Concerning rights of nationals of the United states of America in Morocco, 
Judgment, ICJ Reports 1950, 172, at p. 188 where, despite the French Protectorate, Morocco 
was declared to be ‘a sovereign state’. 
58 International Status of South West Africa, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep 1950, 146, Separate 
Opinion of Judge McNair, p. 150. 
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on the part of the Mandatory power, but rather the fruition of a status temporarily 
subordinated by the fact of colonial administration.  In that respect, the most 
remarkable feature of the process of decolonization was the much more generalised, 
and quasi-legislative, statement found in the General Assembly’s Declaration on 
Friendly Relations59 which declared that ‘the territory of a colony or other non-self-
governing territory has, under the Charter of the United Nations, a status separate 
and distinct from the territory of the State administering it’ [emphasis added].  
When approached from this angle, any apparent tension that existed between the 
General Assembly’s espousal of the principle of self-determination and its 
simultaneous reaffirmation of the principle of territorial integrity could be resolved 
by means of re-casting the relationship between the coloniser and the colonised.  
 
If the principle of self-determination implied a suspension of claims to sovereignty on 
the part of the metropolitan state, it also entailed the non-recognition of attempts to 
subvert that process.  Thus, for example, when a minority white regime in what was 
then Southern Rhodesia declared its independence from Britain in 1965, its unilateral 
declaration of independence was immediately condemned by both the UN General 
Assembly60 and the Security Council. The latter called upon states not to recognise 
the ‘illegal racist minority regime’, and provided for a regime of sanctions to be 
imposed.61  Similarly, but in a different context, when the South African government, 
in pursuit of its policy of apartheid, established the Bantusans of Transkei, Ciskei, 
Venda and Bophuthatswana in the years 1976-1981 under the pretext that this 
constituted an implementation of the principle of ‘self-government’, those claims 
were again rejected with the General Assembly and Security Council, condemning 
their establishment and calling for non-recognition.62  Only in cases in which the 
subversion of self-determination came at the hands of another ‘newly independent 
state’ (eg. Goa, West Irian, East Timor and Western Sahara) was the reaction 
somewhat more muted or equivocal. The rubric of anti-colonialism, it seems, had 
somewhat less purchase in such cases. 
 
If self-determination was the principal mode through which decolonisation was to be 
pushed forward in the 1950s and 60s, its significance was not to be confined to that 
era. On the one hand, there remained – and remain – several colonial and/or 
                                                 
59 GA Res 2625 (XXV), (24 October 1970) 
60 GA Res. 2379 (SSVI), (28 October 1968). 
61 SC Res. 232 (16 December 1966); SC Resn 235 (29 May 1968). 
62 GA Res. 31/6A (26 October 1976); SC Resn. 402, (22 December 1976). 
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territories still under military occupation, for whom the enjoyment of a widely-
acknowledged right to ‘external’ self-determination continues to be thwarted. 
Whereas the statehood of Namibia, first a German colony and then a South African 
mandated territory, was finally recognised in 1990, and whereas East Timor, once a 
Portuguese colony, at last achieved a troubled independence from Indonesian rule in 
1999, the same cannot be said either for Western Sahara (a former Spanish colony, 
now occupied by Morocco), or, perhaps most notoriously of all, for Palestine. As 
Drew has pointed out, the turn to peace negotiations has arguably contributed to the 
problem, amongst other things by equalising the status of the two negotiating 
partners (Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories) and, in doing so, 
relinquishing the particular content of self-determination, whose purpose it is to 
elevate the rights of occupied people above the rights of the occupying power (Drew, 
2001, p 681).  
 
On the other hand, however, the international community has become increasingly 
troubled, particularly since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, by a spiralling number 
of intractable conflicts fought in the name of self-determination, and yet where a 
right of ‘external’ self-determination was not thought to apply in the classical sense. 
In the immediate aftermath of the collapse of Communism the customary distinction 
between ‘external’ and ‘internal’ self-determination was protected, in large part 
through a resort to the terminology of ‘dissolution’ or of ‘consent’. Thus, whilst  many 
of the new states which emerged from behind the ‘iron curtain’ in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s employed the language of self-determination - holding plebiscites or 
national polls by way of authorisation, and in some cases even making a capacity to 
speak the ‘national’ language a determinant of subsequent citizenship (Cassese, 1995 
pp. 257-277) – the idea that this practice might have instanced a displacement of the 
principle of territorial integrity was carefully avoided.  In the case of the USSR itself, 
for example, while widespread and violent demands for independence from Soviet 
rule, unleashed during the period of Perestroika, were certainly a cause of the USSR’s 
collapse, the fact that Russia had effectively renounced, in the Alma Ata Declaration 
and Minsk Accords,63 any legal interest or claims to sovereignty over those regions 
was to lend the process the aura of a consensual ‘parting of ways’ (Mullerson, 1993).  
The two agreements themselves suggested that the Soviet Union had, in fact, ‘ceased 
to exist’ allowing for the emergence to independence of 12 of the 15 the former Soviet 
                                                 
63 Agreement Establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States (Minsk Accord), 8  Dec. 
1991, 31 ILM (1992) 143; Alma Ata Declaration, 21st Dec. 1991, ibid, p. 148. 
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Republics within a loose confederation (the Commonwealth of Independent States) 
out of the ashes of a now defunct state.  That Russia was to claim shortly afterwards 
that it was in fact ‘continuing’ the legal existence of the USSR (retaining importantly 
the privileges of the latter within the UN), did not, ultimately, profoundly change the 
analysis apart from suggesting that the process was better seen as one of consensual 
secession than of disintegration.  Elsewhere, the three Baltic states asserted their 
independence separately on the grounds of their unlawful annexation by the USSR in 
1940, and the former Warsaw Pact states, Hungary, Romania, Poland, and Bulgaria, 
were seen to have merely ‘transitioned’ from Soviet control to full independence 
through the medium of a change of government.  
 
The case of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was probably the most 
revealing however (see Radan 2002).  Prior to 1989, Yugoslavia had (like the USSR 
itself) been a federal state comprising six Republics, representing the major 
‘nationalities’, and two autonomous enclaves (Kosovo and Vojdvodina), each of which 
had representation in the administration of the Federation.  The death of President 
Tito in 1980 was followed by a power-struggle within the Federation culminating in 
declarations of independence being announced on the part of Slovenia and Croatia in 
1991. Both declarations recalled the principle of national self-determination (which 
itself had some recognition in the Federal Constitution).  These initiatives, however, 
were forcibly resisted and the subsequent violence that was then to engulf first 
Croatia and then Bosnia-Herzegovina was so severe that it led to the dispatch of 
peacekeeping forces (UNPROFOR), the establishment of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the later submission of claims of genocide to 
the International Court of Justice. 
 
One of the key questions here for other states was whether or not to recognize the 
statehood of the entities emerging from the conflict.  Doing so had several important 
implications as regards the characterisation of the then-ongoing conflict (whether, 
for example, it was an international rather than merely an internal armed conflict 
(see Gray, 1996)). In terms of the relationship between statehood and self-
determination, however,64 the question of recognition brought into play the 
possibility that a ‘post-colonial’ right of secessionary self-determination might be 
sanctioned in the process, the implications of which would extend far beyond the 
confines of the conflict itself.  Sensing that there were a number of delicate issues 
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involved, the states of the European Economic Community (EEC) formed a 
Conference on Yugoslavia which, in 1991, established what became known as the 
‘Badinter Commission’ (so named after its Chairman Robert Badinter, President of 
the French Constitutional Court) to provide advice on the legal issues arising from 
Yugoslavia’s imminent implosion (see Craven 1995, Terrett 2000). In the Autumn of 
1991 the Badinter Commission issued two significant Opinions that set the stage for 
the subsequent international recognition of Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina 
and, somewhat later, that of Macedonia.  The key advice given by the Badinter 
Commission, having specifically been asked about the implications of the principle of 
self-determination, was to declare that the former SFRY was ‘in the process of 
disintegration’ on the basis that the Federal Organs could no longer wield effective 
power (the suggestion being that the remainder of those Federal organs, and in 
particular the Yugoslav National Army, had effectively been co-opted by the Serbian 
government).   
 
Perhaps what is most interesting about this Opinion, however, is what it left out. 
What the Commission signally did not say was that the ‘nationalities’ within the 
federation possessed a right of secessionary self-determination. On the contrary, it 
remained remarkably silent on the matter of self-determination except to note the 
responsibilities, in terms of human rights, of the new states towards the human rights 
of their future minorities. The Commission’s general reluctance here, no doubt, was 
informed by the sense that the recrudescent ethnic nationalism that underpinned 
these claims to independence, if encouraged, would only exacerbate the conflict still 
further.  Caught thus in a position of neither wanting to ally itself with the Milosevic 
regime, whose campaign of violence had been pursued under the banner of the 
preservation of the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, nor wanting to provide a 
continuing justification for inter-ethnic violence in the name of national self-
determination, the Commission’s determination that the Federation was in the 
process of dissolution was thus a dextrous act.  Its effect was to provide a necessary 
analytical space within which the recognition of the six emergent Republics could 
take place without risk of undermining respect for the principle of territorial 
integrity.  Indeed, in its second Opinion the Badinter Commission reaffirmed the 
principle of uti possidetis explicitly, making clear in the process that the entities 
emerging from the former Yugoslavia were to be those that already had enjoyed 
administrative recognition within the Federation.   
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This solution proposed by the Commission was always to leave a certain ambiguity as 
to the status of Kosovo, which had possessed a degree of administrative 
independence within the Federal structure, but yet had not been one of its 
constituent Republics.  Whether the principle of uti possidetis, as it has come to be 
construed, was sufficiently subtle as to enable an effective distinction to be made 
between different kinds of internal administrative borders is perhaps an open 
question. But the case of Kosovo poses a slightly different set of questions insofar as it 
is held up by some as an illustration of the possibility, alluded to by the Supreme 
Court of Canada (see above), that a ‘external’ right of self-determination may emerge 
in a context in which a people is systematically and violently denied its right to 
‘internal’ self-determination (Williams, 2o03). This amounts, as we shall see in the 
next section, to the argument that there has come to exist, as a matter of post-Cold 
War international law, a right of ‘remedial’ secessionary self-determination.  
 
 
V. DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
If the collapse of Communism in Central and Eastern Europe challenged the 
international community to find a way to uphold international law’s uneasy balance 
between the promises of self-determination and the preservation of state sovereignty, 
it also presented it with an opportunity. For, from its very earliest articulation, the 
idea of self-determination has appeared to give expression to one simple idea – that, 
as Wilson was to put it, ‘governments derive all their just powers from the consent of 
the governed’.65 Whilst undoubtedly a latent idea in most schemes of political 
organisation through the 20th Century, it has in recent years been given further legal 
impetus in idea that there exists an ‘emerging right to democratic governance’ in 
international law (Franck 1996; Fox and Roth, 2000) - the source of which is traced 
to the linkage between the principle of self-determination and the individual rights of 
political participation (article 25 ICCPR) and evidenced in the emerging practice of 
multilateral election monitoring and other initiatives designed to promote democracy 
and human rights (‘low intensity democracy’ as Marks puts it (Marks, 2003)).  
 
There are two plausible ways in which this concern for democracy and human rights 
may impinge upon the question of statehood: one as an additional ‘condition’ that 
needs to be met before independence may be recognized (one of the earliest examples 
                                                 
65 President Woodrow Wilson, Second Inaugural Address, 5 March 1917.  
This is a draft of a chapter that has been accepted for publication by Oxford University Press in 
the forthcoming book International Law, 5th edition edited by Malcolm Evans.  
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/24772/  
 
being Fawcett’s interpretation of the Southern Rhodesian crisis in 1965 (Fawcett, 
1965-66)); the other as a basis for the exercise of self-determination on the part of a 
community suffering oppression or systematically excluded from access to 
government (sometimes referred to, as noted above, as ‘remedial secession’).  In 
respect of the first, there is some evidence to suggest that, in Europe at least, states 
have been keen to incorporate questions concerning human rights and democracy 
into their decision-making on recognition. Thus, shortly after the beginning of the 
conflict in Yugoslavia in 1991, the EC member states convened at an extraordinary 
EPC ministerial meeting to adopt a common policy on the recognition of states 
emerging from the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.  The result was a set of guidelines in 
which they affirmed ‘their readiness to recognise, subject to the normal standards of 
international practice and political realities in each case, those new states which… 
have constituted themselves on a democratic basis’.66  Further to this, they set out 
several additional conditions including: (1) respect for the provisions of the UN 
Charter and the Helsinki Final Act ‘especially with regard to the rule of law, 
democracy and human rights; (2) guarantees for the rights of ethnic and national 
groups and minorities; (3) respect for the inviolability of existing borders; (4) 
acceptance of all relevant arms control commitments; and (5) a commitment to 
settling all future questions of state succession and regional disputes by agreement.  
In the event, these guidelines were very loosely applied.  The recognition of Croatia, 
for example, proceeded in early 1992 despite the fact that the Badinter Commission 
had found that it had not fully complied with the relevant conditions. By contrast, the 
recognition of Macedonia was held up not on the grounds of its failure to meet these 
conditions, but rather as a consequence of an ongoing dispute with Greece over its 
name.67 Thus, while considerable enthusiasm remains for the idea that the new states 
acquiring their independence would remain bound by all pre-existent human rights 
treaty commitments that were formally applicable to that territory (Kamminga 1996, 
Craven, 2007, pp. 244-256), commentators remain cautious as to the legal 
significance of the Guidelines when taken by themselves (Murphy, 2000, p. 139).  
 
When placed in the context of other developments, however, the picture looks rather 
different. For example, in the 1990s several regimes of international territorial 
administration were put in place, both in Eastern Europe (in Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
                                                 
66 Declaration on the ‘Guidelines on the Recognition of New states in Eastern Europe and in 
the Soviet Union’, (1992) 31 ILM 1486. 
67 See Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (The former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia v Greece, Judgment, ICJ Reports 2011. 
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Kosovo) and elsewhere (in East Timor, for example), in the wake of wars 
characterised by widespread abuses of human rights and international humanitarian 
law, which placed the task of securing the rule of law and the protection of human 
rights at centre stage (Wilde, 2008).  As some have argued, such regimes seemed to 
function as institutional precursors to independence in such a way as to be evidence 
of a new emerging doctrine of ‘earned sovereignty’- earned in the sense of being 
phased, conditional and perhaps even constrained. ‘Sovereignty’, on this view, is no 
longer a right of states or colonised/occupied peoples but rather a ‘bundle of rights’ 
available to be allocated, by the ‘international community’ and by degrees, depending 
on the extent to which such conditions are met (Williams, Scharf and Hooper, 2002-
3). Yet as critics of this ‘earned sovereignty’ approach have noted, whatever the 
perceived merits of such an agenda, and however far this may be thought to open out 
a new realm of policy alternatives, it is hard to shake off the sense that this amounts 
to anything other than a new ‘standard of civilisation’ – that is, a highly selective 
reinstitution, under UN auspices, of the old Mandate/Trusteeship arrangement in 
which territories were ‘prepared’ for independence under the tutelage of colonial 
masters (Drew, 2007, 87-92; Wilde, 2010, pp. 261-62).  
 
Just as there is a certain hesitancy about the role that considerations of democracy 
and human rights might play in the recognition of new states, so also there is 
significant equivocation over the extent to which those considerations might serve as 
a basis for legitimating secession.  As we have seen, in its advisory opinion 
concerning the secessionist claims of Quebec, the Canadian Supreme Court had 
asserted that the international law right to self-determination gave a right to external 
self-determination in situations ‘where a people is oppressed’ or where ‘a definable 
group is denied meaningful access to government to pursue their political, economic, 
social and cultural development’.68 It was to conclude, however, that Quebec ‘did not 
meet the threshold of a colonial people or an oppressed people’ and since the 
Quebecers had not been denied ‘meaningful access to government’ they did not enjoy 
the right to effect the secession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally.  Rather, they 
enjoyed a (Constitutional) right to negotiate the terms of a separation.  
 
A somewhat different context was to pertain, however, in the case of Kosovo when the 
International Court of Justice was requested by the General Assembly to consider the 
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lawfulness of its Declaration of Independence of 2008.69  As was detailed in the 
evidence presented to the Court (and had earlier been highlighted by the ICTY in the 
Mulinovic case70) the Kosovo Albanians had been the object of discrimination, 
repression and violence throughout the 1990s, and in particular during the violence 
of 1998-9 which had itself ultimately led to the adoption of Security Council 
Resolution 1244 (1999) and the establishment of UNMIK.  Whilst, as several judges 
pointed out in their Separate Opinions (eg Judges Yusuf and Sepúlveda-Amor) the 
Court might naturally have been led to consider whether, in the circumstances, the 
population enjoyed a right of remedial secession, the majority evaded the question 
entirely; and focused rather on the narrowest of issues - whether the authors of the 
Declaration had acted in violation of international law (which, it found, they had not).  
That this neither resolved the issue as to whether the Kosovars had a right to external 
self-determination, nor whether the subsequent recognition of its independence 
might constitute a violation of Serbian sovereignty, was to leave Kosovo ultimately in 
a state of limbo (recognised by 115 states as of February 2017, but unrecognised by 
many others). 
 
One reason for caution on the part of the International Court, no doubt, related to the 
fact that it wanted to avoid setting some kind of precedent in light of the various 
movements that were seeking independence in the region around the Black Sea and 
the Caucasus. Between 1990 and 2014 at least seven purported new states have 
declared their independence in this region, starting with the ‘Pridnestrovian 
Moldavian Republic’ or ‘Transnistria’, which declared its independence from 
Moldova on 2 September 1990, and the ‘Republic of Artsakh’ (more commonly 
known as Nagorno-Karabakh), on 2 September 1991 in territory claimed both by 
Armenia and Azerbaijan. Then, in mid-2008, two nascent states – the ‘Republic of 
Abkhazia’ or ‘Apsny’ and the Republic of South Ossetia, also known as ‘Alania’ – 
declared their independence from Georgia with strong Russian support. Transnistria 
and Artsakh have been recognised either not at all (in the case of the latter) or (in the 
case of Transnistria) by their fellow separatist entities in the so-called ‘Community 
for Democracy and Rights of Nations’ formed by these four renegade republics. By 
contrast, both Abkhazia and South Ossetia were immediately recognised by Russia, 
along with a handful of other states (such as Nauru and Venezuela). Finally (at least 
                                                 
69 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 
Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2010, p 403. 
70 Prosecutor v. Multinovic et al, Judgment, 26 February 2009. 
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for the moment), in 2014, the ‘Republic of Crimea’, the Donetsk Peoples’ Republic’ 
and the ‘Luhansk People's Republic’ all declared their independence from Ukraine.  
 
In all of these cases, the assertion of a right to self-determination was accompanied 
by allegations of ethnically-motivated oppression on the part of the state from which 
they wanted to secede. These claims have, in case of the Georgian and Ukrainian 
entities, been supported by the Russian government. Explaining Russia’s recognition 
of Abkazia and South Ossetia’s independence, for example, Russian Prime Minister 
Dmitry Medvedev insisted that in doing so his country had been acting on the basis of 
‘their freely expressed desire for independence…based on the principles of the United 
Nations Charter’ as well with ‘international precedents for such a move’, specifically 
the recognition of Kosovo’s independence by ‘Western countries’. ‘In international 
relations,’ Medvedev warned, ‘you cannot have one rule for some and another rule for 
others.71 The question remains, however, as to whether ethnic Abkhazians, Ossetians 
and (in Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk) ethnic Russians have, indeed, been the 
subject of ‘ethnic cleansing’ on the part of Georgia and Ukraine respectively sufficient 
to justify their claims to external self-determination; and how any response to that 
question might take account, also, of similar allegations regarding the ‘ethnic 
cleansing’ of Georgians, Ukrainians, Ukrainian Tartars and others in the territories 
concerned. According to Georgia, for example, in its application to the ICJ, ‘[t]he 
Russian Federation’s support of separatist elements within the Ossetian and Abkhaz 
ethnic minorities and their de facto authorities has the effect of denying the right of 
self-determination to the ethnic Georgians remaining in South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia’.72  Ukraine, in similar vein, alleges systematic discrimination by Russia 
both prior to and in the wake of the annexation against Crimea’s Tartar population 
amounting, in its terms, to ‘collective punishment’ and ‘collective erasure’.73 
What is most striking, of course, has been the spectre of Russian intervention, both 
direct and indirect, in all of these secessionist enterprises with the exception only of 
Artsakh/Nagorno-Karabakh. Whilst in all cases the declarations of independence had 
been underpinned by referenda (the Transnistrian referendum only being held, 
                                                 
71 Dmitry Medvedev, ‘Why I had to recognise Georgia's breakaway regions’, Financial Times, 
27 Aug. 2008, p. 9.  
72 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, Application Instituting Proceedings at the International Court of Justice, 
Georgia v Russian Federation, 12 Aug. 2008, p. 10, para. 14.  
73 Terrorism Financing and Racial Discrimination in Ukraine, Application Instituting 
Proceedings ot the International Court of Justice, Ukraine v Russian Federation, 16 Jan. 2017, 
p. 27.  
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however, several years after the event in 2006), those referenda have nevertheless 
been widely condemned as having been underpinned by a climate of intimidation 
allegedly engineered, in each case, to ensure a favourable vote. Indeed, so violent and 
extensive has Russia’s involvement in these secessionist movements been that both 
Georgia and Ukraine have brought cases against Russia before the ICJ, as noted 
above, alleging the latter’s violation of the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination and, in Ukraine’s case, also of the Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.   
Of particular note, here, is the case of Crimea which stated its intention, prior to the 
holding of the referendum, that if a majority returned a vote in favour of 
independence, that it would simultaneously seek integration into the Russian 
Federation. Two days after that ‘yes’ vote was received in the referendum on 16 
March, the self-declared Republic of Crimea concluded a treaty with Russia to bring 
this about. Given that the referendum in Crimea was not only unconstitutional under 
Ukrainian law, but also held in a situation in which masked Russian troops had 
already seized hold of and dissolved the Crimean Supreme Council (Crimea’s  
regional parliament) neither its pro-independence vote nor the subsequent treaty 
with Russia has been recognised by the international community (as the General 
Assembly underscored in its Resolution 68/262 of 27 March 2014). Crimea is now 
widely understood to have been unlawfully annexed by the Russian Federation.74 
Whilst the majority of the international community has looked on at these 
developments with some dismay (see, for example, Resolution 382 of the NATO 
Parliament Assembly in respect of Georgia, General Assembly Resolution 68/262 in 
respect of Ukraine, and the European Parliament’s resolution in support of Moldovan 
sovereignty),75 the shadow cast by the Kosovo case is unmistakable.   Not only does it 
appear to have given impetus to the holding of unauthorised/ illegal referenda (an 
                                                 
74 One should also note continued Russian presence/involvement in a number of the other 
entities in question which ranges from the issuing of Russian passports to (ethnically 
Abkhazian, Ossetian and Russian) Georgian and Ukrainian citizens in these areas to the 
outright seizure by Russian soldiers of institutional control and state territory. 
75 ‘The Situation in Georgia’, 2010 NATO Parliament Assembly, Resolution 382 refers to 
‘Georgia’s occupied territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia’, while the in ‘Territorial 
integrity of Ukraine’, A/RES/68/262 or 27 Mar. 2014, the General Assembly called upon ‘all 
States to desist and refrain from actions aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national 
unity and territorial integrity of Ukraine’ and upon ‘all States, international organizations and 
specialized agencies not to recognize any alteration of the status of the Autonomous 
Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol’ arising from the flawed referendum of 2016 
(paras. 2 and 6); European Parliament resolution on Moldova (Transnistria), 25 Oct.20-6, 
‘denounc[ing] the attempt in the Moldovan region of Transnistria to establish its 
independence in a unilateral way by organising a so-called referendum’. 
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issue, at the time of writing, being confronted both by Spain in respect of Catalonia 
and Iraq in respect of its Kurdistan Region) but has clearly opened the door to a new 
form of ‘interventionist self-determination’ that arguably finds its origins in a 
melding of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention on the one hand, and that of 




In an article written in the early 1990s, Martti Koskenniemi reflected upon the 
contemporary resonance of Engel’s notion of the ‘withering away’ of the state.  In 
Koskenniemi’s view, there were two versions of this thesis in circulation.  One was a 
‘sociological’ version that, on observing the recent globalisation of politics, argues 
that ‘states are no longer able to handle problems such as massive poverty, pollution 
of the atmosphere, or even their own security’ without entering into forms of 
cooperation that entail the ‘gradual dissolution of sovereignty’ (Koskenniemi, 1994b, 
p. 22).  The other was an ‘ethical’ version that regards statehood as a form of ‘morally 
indefensible egotism’ that either serves to create and perpetuate ‘artificial distinctions 
among members of the human community’ or to justify the use of state apparatus for 
oppression.  Each of these critiques stresses the artificiality of the state as an idea or 
institution; each also sees its withering away as essentially beneficial. As we have 
seen, these two standpoints are not external to the state, but rather run through the 
discourses on sovereignty, self-determination, legitimacy and recognition that 
constitute it.  There is a constant equivocation, in all such discussions, as to whether 
the world is to be taken ‘as it is’ (in which we might be inclined to treat statehood as a 
question of fact, effectiveness as the primary condition, recognition as declaratory 
and sovereignty as innate), or as something which must be engineered to correspond 
to those values which we take to be universal and necessary (in which case, we might 
treat statehood as being a matter of law, self-determination or democratic legitimacy 
as primary conditions, recognition as quasi-constitutive, and sovereignty as delegated 
or conditional).  To note the equivocation, here, however is to underscore what 
Koskenniemi sees as the untenable character of either position. On the one hand the 
ethics in question will always be situational, a product of certain social conditions 
arising at a particular point in time; on the other hand, what we call social reality 
itself ‘is in the last resort an ethical construction’ dependent upon our willingness to 
act ‘as if’ the world were really like that. In his view, therefore, the state ‘as a pure 
form’ is valuable as a ‘location’ or ‘language’ within which ‘we can examine the 
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consequences and acceptability of the various jargons of authenticity’, as he calls 
them, which seek to challenge the state’s normative universality and ‘set them in a 
specific relationship so as to enable political action’ (Koskenniemi, 1994b, p. 28).  
 
One of themes developed in this chapter, however, has been to explain how many of 
these seemingly abstract theoretical arguments about recognition, statehood or 
sovereignty arose in a specific historical, geographical and cultural context. However 
much these phenomena may have been ‘globalised’ over the past five centuries, the 
fact remains that the sovereign state is a Western European invention, whose 
universality came to be theorised in and through Europe’s encounter with the non-
European world from the late-16th century onwards.  As we saw above, the difficulties 
involved - in 19th century jurisprudence in particular - in seeking to delimit the scope 
of international law by reference to the pre-existence of (European) nation-states, 
while simultaneously employing a prescriptive notion of statehood to supervise 
‘entry’ into the family of nations, conditioned many of the theoretical puzzles that 
subsequently emerged.  
 
Yet for those located in the non-European world – perhaps for Indigenous peoples 
most acutely – as well as for those groups who continue to find themselves on the 
margins of the state, the problem is not merely a theoretical one. On the contrary, the 
assumptions about land (‘territory’), subjectivity (‘population’), order (‘government’) 
and community (‘independence’) that comprise the state are not only conceptually 
incompatible with alternatives; they are also destructive, in a material sense, of the 
societies and environments to which those alternatives refer (Black, 2011; Borrows, 
2002; Rivera, 1984; Simpson, 2014; Watson, 2015). The language of statehood is 
itself a ‘jargon of authenticity’ from this perspective. For Marxist, ‘Third World’, 
feminist, queer, Indigenous and many other ‘situated’ observers of international law 
(Haraway, 1988, p. 590), it was and remains difficult to the accept the idea that the 
state is simply normatively indeterminate, whether as a concept or as a practice 
(Miéville, 2005; Chimni, 2017; Charlesworth & Chinkin, 2000; Ruskola, 2010; 
Coulthard, 2014). All refer, in one form or another, to the presence of what might be 
called a ‘structural bias’ (Koskenniemi, 2005, pp. 606-615) in the language and 
practice of statehood that, in practice, privileges certain kinds of politics, certain ways 
of being in the world, and certain orders of power and wealth (Scott, 1998). This, 
undoubtedly, provides part of the rationale behind the establishment of an entity like 
the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria or ‘Rojava’, an avowedly non-state 
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region governed on the basis of ‘a new social contract’ led by principles of gender 
equality, environmental sustainability and ‘democratic autonomy’. 76 
 
As to why, elsewhere in the world, statehood continues to hold out the ultimate 
promise of collective emancipation, one answer may be found in the way in which the 
old imperial language of hierarchy, civilisation and progress has come to be 
translated into the (supposedly) more technical language of economics and, in 
particular, of development (Pahuja, 2011).  The nation-state, in this sense, continues 
to be presented as an object of work, that has to be sustained, supported, performed 
and ‘perfected’ (to invoke Wolff) through initiatives, for example, to promote good 
governance, the rule of law, economic growth and human rights. This new 
articulation of the state’s objectives have, in turn, legitimated a ‘muscular 
humanitarianism’ (Orford 2003), legitimating intervention not because of a state’s 
egregious pathologies but perhaps because it is not pathological enough. As the 
pressure on the world’s physical ‘resources’ continues to mount, however, the 
‘perfectability’ of the state is thrown increasingly into doubt. In this context, the ‘turn 
to secession’ – the flight from the disappointments of an existing state towards the 
promises held out by a new one – may turn out to be one of this century’s greatest 
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